A SOVIET WEEKLY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

THE BARSCHEL DEATH MYSTERY

NEW TIMES



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MONGOLIAN ECONOMY
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

INDIRA GANDHI'S HERITAGE

1917–1987

TIME AND PEOPLE

U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles once remarked that there are only two sorts of people: Christians and advocates of free enterprise and the rest. After the second world war the United States, confident of its superiority, relied on power politics. In the early 1950s it was engaged in the Korean war, and France was deeply involved in the armed intervention against the peoples of Indo-China.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly called for a collective security system in Europe with the participation of the United States. In addition to NATO, new military blocks like ANZUS, SEATO and CENTO were set up on Washington's initiative throughout the world.

American newspapers published calls for a "preemptive" war against the Soviet Union. Despite Moscow's numerous warnings, the agreements on Bonn's entry into NATO came into force on May 5, 1955, only ten years after the allied victory over nazi Germany. Having exhausted diplomatic means, the socialist countries were compelled to form the Warsaw Treaty Organization as a counterbalance to NATO.

The Soviet parliament adopted a decision on ending nuclear tests and urged other powers to follow suit. But Moscow's move was not reciprocated.

At the same time a radical change in the minds of millions of people was becoming increasingly evident. In 1950 the Stockholm meeting of the Permanent Committee of the World Congress for Peace adopted an appeal against atomic weapons.

The question of a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem was on the agenda of an international conference held in Geneva in 1954. ● Frédéric Joliot-Curi, the distinguished French physicist and first president of the World Peace Council. ● Soviet people sign the Stockholm Appeal in 1950. ● Hewlett Johnson, Alexander Fadeyev and Pablo Picasso in an interval between sessions of the first World Congress for Peace in Paris in 1949.

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

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

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

2 **Meeting of the representatives of parties and movements who came to Moscow for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.**

NEW TIMES

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EDITORIAL

A TRIUMPH OF NEW THINKING

This year's anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution were not true to form. Instead of the customary pomp, empty talk and braggadocio they were marked by an atmosphere of honesty and dialectics, reform and innovation, concern about and responsibility for the future. Even Red Square, the epicentre of the national holiday, was not as heavily bedecked with posters as usual but revealed the unadorned and austere beauty of the Kremlin.

Representatives from the parties and movements that had sent their delegations to Moscow for the celebrations of the 70th anniversary described their meeting here as unusual, unprecedented, unique. The idea of holding the meeting was a product of our perestroika and glasnost. The democratic character and openness of the discussions made it a success.

This multilateral dialogue, in which the participants neither followed a predetermined agenda, nor were under the obligation to adopt coordinated documents, lasted for two days. Everyone who addressed it spoke his mind and was heard out with respect. All those seated at the round table - Communists and Social Democrats, representatives of national liberation movements and Socialists, Greens from the industrialized nations and prominent figures from the developing countries - were on an equal footing.

The meeting attracted 178 delegations; 119 participants had their names entered on the list of speakers, but there was only time for 63 of them to make their speeches. By a unanimous vote the texts of the other statements are published in Pravda. This is the quantitative side of the matter. But what was the meeting about? Did the speakers manage to find a common language? After all, those who gathered in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses were people of different views, ideologies, and religions and represented a broad spectrum of contemporary social thought. Until comparatively recently, the differences between some of them seemed irreconcilable, and whatever opportunities for contacts presented themselves were rejected outright.

Is this really a thing of the past? Not at all. The Moscow meeting too heard viewpoints that were poles apart. What was it then that had brought the participants together? Let them answer this question themselves.

Athos Fava, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Argentina: "It was the conviction that the world must be saved in order to be changed, and changed in order to be saved."

Ram Ratan Rama, General Secretary of the All-India Congress Committee of the Indian National Congress (I): "While retaining its value and practical importance, mankind's age-old experience cannot provide the answers to all modern problems. Consequently, there is an acute need today to draw upon the collective wisdom of mankind."

Sture Ericsson, Swedish Social Democrat: "It is not only our right but also our responsibility to work for a world free from nuclear weapons."

And so, the question of questions now is whether human civilization is, or is not, to be. Concern for the fate of humankind has brought millions to the forefront of history today. It was this concern too that compelled different political forces to come together and pool their efforts. The Moscow meeting gave them a chance to do so.

It is still too early to sum up its results. That will take time. But one thing is already perfectly clear today. All the participants benefitted from the meeting, and none was any the worse for having attended it. What's more, the free creative discussion was a triumph of new thinking.

Arrogant omniscience is unpopular today. It does not do anybody any credit. On the other hand, the need for reform, for qualitative changes, is felt everywhere. It is an imperative of our time that traditional values be reassessed, and traditional patterns and stereotypes discarded.

Achieving this is certainly no easy matter. There are no ready recipes to follow. The Communists do not claim a monopoly on the absolute truth. We are looking ourselves, and invite all those concerned to cooperate with us in looking for ways which could lead mankind through the "minefield" of the present to a non-nuclear and non-violent 21st century, Mikhail Gorbachev told the meeting.

To stave off the mortal danger hanging over the world - this was the leitmotif of the Moscow forum, for which our great national holiday provided a fitting occasion.

AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE FUTURE

Present-day realities and new political thinking

Much has already been said about the great dangers confronting mankind today.

These global dangers include the hold of obsolete, prejudiced and narrow interests on the human mind, preventing people from embracing universal values.

Is the human mind powerless in the face of these dangers?

As Francis Bacon put it three and a half centuries ago, if we are to deliver ourselves from the idols and false notions that hold our minds captive, we must restore our capacity for sound reasoning. Renewal must be effected all the way down to the very foundations, he explained, if we do not want to go round eternally in circles, making only infinitesimal progress.

Today the instinct for self-preservation alone will no longer do. Mankind needs new thinking to a greater extent than ever before, now that the planet is threatened not merely with retarded progress but with total destruction.

The appeal for new thinking is not born of idealism. Human intellectual potential is a substantial material force. Mankind's pressing problems are not abstract notions, and when we reflect on them we are considering specific and real phenomena and actions. Our current problems must be tackled with the future in mind.

Below, Soviet scientists share their views on the problems of today's world.

Academician EVGENY PRIMAKOV

In his report at the anniversary session, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed the need for urgent and radical solutions to the developing countries' problems. These solutions are to manifest themselves in the democratization of world economic exchanges, the abolition of neocolonialism, and so on. These are essential changes which would contribute to the stabilization of the international situation. The Soviet Union has always supported the developing countries' demand that the anomalies resulting from the activities of transnational corporations in the Third World be corrected. We favour a democratic solution to the problems associated with the developing countries' enormous foreign debt.

It is the No. 1 objective of world politics to neutralize trends that threaten the very existence of human civilization. Needless to say, the disarmament issue is of prime importance in this context. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has never opposed it to the problem of abolishing international conflicts. We realize how important it is to end international conflicts in various parts of the world: they could trigger off

Workers demonstrate in Moscow's Red Square on November 7, 1987.

Photo by Yuri Inyakin

a global explosion. This realization is behind the Soviet approach to the events in the Persian Gulf. We want, above all, an end to the Iran-Iraq war, which is taking a huge toll of both nations' manhood as well as destroying enormous material resources.

At the same time we have to take into account the objective need to ensure freedom of navigation. We have made proposals in this connection - for instance, that naval forces be formed under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union is against separate solutions of the Middle East problem. Separate solutions lead nowhere. A conference is the only way to ensure a universal and all-embracing settlement. The Soviet Union has come out firmly in support of convening a peace conference on the Middle East.

Israel is now trying to block the conference, but I do not believe it will succeed. It seems to me that the persistent effort to convene an international peace conference on the Middle East will create a situation where Israel will find itself in ever greater isolation.

VALENTIN FALIN, D. Sc. (Hist.)

The celebration of the 70th anniversary of the October revolution and the wide repercussions by which it was followed have brought out the special meaning of what has come to be known as new thinking in international affairs. Like all important internatiolnal questions, it was neither spontaneous, nor came as a revelation. It has emerged from a painstaking analysis of real objective processes.

It was necessary to revise many notions and denounce the dogmas that had made themselves felt over decades and sometimes even determined the approach to international problems.

New thinking presupposes new ethics and a new mentality. New thinking should be regarded as a process, as **collective** wisdom shared by all mankind. No system has a monopoly on the truth.

In his anniversary report, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of the need for higher standards in international relations so that they should draw upon the entire wealth of past experience and serve to achieve an understanding of the world in all its variety and with all its contradictions. It is only provided that the "arrogance of omniscience," as Mikhail Gorbachev put it, is discarded that genuine dialogue is possible. To some extent, such international relations open up non-traditional perspectives. In the process of establishing new political standards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is interested in the broadening and deepening of contacts and links, and a more active exchange of views on all the key issues of today with all democratic movements, trends and parties, in particular with Social Democratic and Socialist parties.

Preventing war and achieving disarmament (nuclear disarmament especially) are naturally top priorities. Moreover, we attach great importance to ecology - in a word, to everything on which the future of civilization and life on earth depend. All differences which might hinder our advance in the main directions must be relegated to the background. This is part of the new thinking, which we are talking about in the open and which we invite all others to share.

The purpose of modern politics is to make possibiities a reality. And new thinking is not only a theory, it is already working. Prerequisites are now arising for a breakthrough to a better, less dangerous world with nuclear arms stockpiles eliminated or substantially reduced. The Soviet leadership holds that this chance is not to be missed. It put active work into preparing a Soviet-U.S. summit. Thanks to the two sides' positions being brought closer together by mutual effort, the summit agenda has been coordinated, and some other questions settled to give the summit a green light.

It's worth stressing that those were mutual, not unilateral efforts!

The importance of normalizing Soviet-U.S. relations for the improvement of the international situation is obvious. It was pointed out at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, however, that the Soviet Union does not confine its interests in the international arena and its foreign policy to its relations with the U.S. We do not and shall not lose sight of the problems of cooperation with other countries, especially neighbouring ones. Soviet foreign policy is aimed at creating a climate of sincere, honest and stable understanding with all countries for the benefit of all and each, with a view to asserting the principles of good partnership, mutual confidence and harmony in international relations. ■

There can be no doubt that in the eyes of the international community Mikhail Gorbachev's report "The October and perestroika: the Revolution continues" stands out today as the No. 1 political document, a considered statement on the part of socialism as it stands at the forefront of world history. Its wealth of theory and methodology provides much food for thought. The report will become, and has indeed already become, an object of close analysis, a source of shared ideas not only for Communists and Socialists, scientists and political observers but, and this is perhaps infinitely more important, for millions upon millions of people of good will concerned about the fate of the world, its present and its future.

The October Revolution and perestroika - these concepts now march shoulder to shoulder. That is why they stand side by side in the report. Although the revolution won immense moral authority a long time ago, perestroika burst upon our lives only comparatively recently. Perestroika is a new word - for many until recently it was not even part of their vocabulary and not everyone as yet understands its full meaning. However, people soon realized that it meant much more than its literal translation "restructuring," and that it foreshadows revolutionary changes in our country.

Many people, and I am no exception, are today asking: what are the goals of these changes? If perestroika is a process - and it is - then it must have an ultimate goal? One can't immediately find an answer to that question, one that satisfies both the mind and the senses. Formal logic tells one that a beginning is followed by development which is followed by a conclusion. But can formal logic be applied in this case? More and more people are coming to realize that it is no longer possible to drop glasnost, democratization, or our new ethical code of labour....

Yes, perestroika is indeed a process. But wouldn't it be more correct to interpret it as a new way of life? Won in battle from circumstances not always favourable to socialism, which is the optimal way of life? Let us take a closer look at the Soviet leader's report. Whatever aspect of perestroika he considered - a critical view of the past, our triumphs and misfortunes; the decisive dismantling of obsolete traditions in economic management; the all-out open battle against bureaucratism and incompetence; the extension of the rights and opportunities open to the working man, the collective, and all of society; realistic planning - each of these corresponds fully to the goals of socialism, to the requirements of genuine people's power.

And the concepts of survival and universal security correspond equally to the interests of the whole of mankind. They cannot be regarded as transient aims.

Revolution means action...

ANATOLY KARPYCHEV

Much from the arsenal of perestroika is a return to the genuine norms of socialism and their further development. Of course, today we are operating within the framework of the realities we live with, and we are doing our utmost to enrich them. We are learning to value the individual and his dignity, and on this basis to resolve the tasks set by the changing times. It is absolutely clear to me that recognition of the workingman and his interests as the highest values in society is not just a slogan of perestroika, but a fundamental tenet of socialism.

It is not only the times that are changing, but people too.

I see them as honest, decent and with a dignity of their own.

Perhaps, these attributes are synonimous.

●

But why has honesty suddenly turned out to be in short supply?

Probably because there is more than just one alternative to honesty. Bureaucratism, red tape, reliance on instructions, the tendency to inaction - all this has established itself firmly at many levels in recent years. And all these can be described as different facets of dishonesty vis-à-vis one's country, its interests and its expectations. Can it be described as honest to inflate one's own authority instead of getting things done? Or to use the quantity figure in economics as a mighty shield (because the quantity figure does not reveal the whole picture)? Subservience to higher ranks, the fabrication of myths - these too are alternatives to honesty and decency. As are the tendency to await orders instead of analyzing a situation for oneself, look for instructions from above instead of thinking things out on one's own and take decisions within a narrow circle instead of after an open debate.

Dishonesty often likes to dress up impressively. Sometimes its attributes are furs and diamonds, the official cars and country homes of the nouveaux riches, signifying the different rungs on the ladder of prestige. But what proved far more dangerous was when dishonesty bandied about correct slogan, operated with the right words, but did not back them up with the right actions.

My job is such that each day I read numerous letters received from our readers. Today they are very frank and confiding, and many of them are about honesty.

Reading them, it is easy to understand that no matter how often perestroika, its prospects and its pace are mentioned, a person can cease to believe in slogans if he cannot recall what has changed in the past eighteen months to two years in his neighbourhood, or work place. The reverse is equally true. If right next to his village a services centre has been opened and he no longer has to drag his TV set 50 kilometres to be repaired, then the **views** - I dare even say the **people's views,** on the persistence, influence, and responsibility of the bodies of power for which they cast their votes at elections change.... Honesty is not merely telling the bitter truth about the mistakes of the past. It also has to ensure that such mistakes are impossible today and tomorrow. Therein lies the creative aspect of perestroika, of the titanic job the party is calling on the entire nation to carry through. To quote Mikhail Gorbachev, its object is "to eliminate not only the stagnation and conservatism of the preceding period and correct the mistakes committed, but also doing away with outdated social patterns and work methods."

IT IS NOT ONLY THE TIMES THAT ARE CHANGING, BUT PEOPLE TOO.

●

I should like to mention another feature of readers' letters. It concerns dignity - human dignity in the framework of the events taking place in the country.

I quote: "Our press and TV programmes today are full of stereotyped slogans like 'Be a fighter for perestroika!', 'In the vanguard of perestroika!', etc. A serious, worthwhile task should not be reduced to such drivel...."

There is an element of truth in these comments. Isn't it the case that we at times talk too much about perestroika (and irresponsibly at that)? Do the papers and magazines really need to overuse the word? Almost everything under the sun comes under the heading of perestroika! A leaking roof in a block of flats has been repaired - and a jubilant report is sent to the newspapers about perestroika among the local authorities! A neighbour has left his kitchen light burning all night - he is wasting electricity and is therefore against perestroika. And a critical letter is posted....

This juggling with the word "perestroika" is not always innocuous. At one factory (I give the gist of the letter) a group of innovators tried unsuccessfully to get their invention introduced. To this day they have been unable to make headway, although at the factory a vast poster calling for democratization is prominently displayed.

The tasks the country has set itself are far from easy. They can only be accomplished by a self-confident individual, with a sense of personal dignity and the ability to take an active position in life.

Recently I had a business appointment with an economic manager. A well-groomed man sat at his desk in the office and murmured almost dreamily:

"It would be lovely to know how perestroika works...."

He was waiting for instructions. Yet at his enterprise there were problems in plenty. Surely he didn't need to wait for instructions to get down to resolving them.

That example sums up the essence of perestroika. It is impossible without initiative, independent action, and getting rid of social apathy; impossible if one simply decides to sit back and adopt a wait-and-see attitude.

The inertia in our thinking is probably one of the hardest things to deal with. It is perhaps responsible for the appearance of arbitrary plans, and continues quietly to generate things that have already been condemned by the people. The new liberated thinking is not confined to relations between countries. It is no less necessary today inside the country, in our own home, at every work place without exception.

Otherwise what will happen? We shall slip back into yesterday's double "bookkeeping" system: one thing said from the rostrum, and the other at home.... A person cannot be progressive and display foresight during working hours, and for the rest of the time remain on the sidelines as an observer. It's either one or the other. The real history of socialism as we see it in Mikhail Gorbachev's report teaches us that far from self-evident axiom. Stagnation and inertia are of their very nature alien to socialism. The determining feature of socialism is progress. As Lenin put it, "a time of revolution is a time of action, of action from both above and below."

The revolution is far from over. ■

THE ART OF WEIGHING POSSIBILITIES

Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander BESSMERTNYKH talks to our reporter Galina Sidorova about the problems confronting Soviet diplomacy, firmness and flexibility in politics, and the peculiar character of Soviet-American relations.

As far as I know, your diplomatic career has for a long time been connected with the United States. Could it be said that our relations with that country are now entering a new channel, or that they are merely on a new upgrade to be followed by a decline, as has happened more than once in the past? And, in general, is stability possible in Soviet-American relations?

I have, indeed, been concerned with Soviet-American relations for some time, and this allows me to say that for the most part it has been a period of upsurges and declines. One is of course justified in asking why this has happened, and I can hardly keep myself from replying that the fault lies entirely with the United States. But this would be simplistic. Soviet-American relations are influenced by the state of affairs in the world, and subjective as well as objective factors interfere in them.

For all that, if Soviet-American relations are viewed as a formula, the variable factor in them will be the behaviour of the United States.

The Soviet Union has always needed stable relations with the United States. We have always realized that it is our principal opponent, our principal partner and, as likely as not, our principal potential military adversary. Besides, relations based on tension or aggravated by confrontation are basically alien to our foreign policy.

It will be recalled that when the Reagan administration came to power its officials declared that they would not hold talks with Moscow on any issue, least of all on arms limitation. It was bluntly stated that the 1980s would be a period of building up U.S. military might, not of arms limitation.

From the outset of this dark period the Soviet Union has been trying to put its relations with the United States on a firm foundation, and today it can be said that the results of these efforts are self-evident. The Americans initiated negotiations with us and have now been holding them for several years. Both countries are on the threshold of considerable achievements. The first ever agreement on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles - medium- and shorter-range - is at hand. In fact, it is one large class of missiles with a range of action from 500 to 5,500 kilometres.

There are a number of reasons for this slow but steady change in direction. First of all, world opinion has veered in favour of disarmament. The new Soviet thinking is also exerting a strong influence. It is not merely breaking down stereotypes, some of which are bursting like soap bubbles. It is advancing a concrete, substantive policy.

This policy, I think, started with Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15, 1986, in which he declared that the world can be freed of nuclear weapons. Many people abroad received it at first as a hypothetical and idealistic scheme. It should be admitted that not a few such plans had indeed been advanced in the past. I have in mind the general and complete disarmament for which we called in the 1960s, when the ground for it had not been sufficiently prepared.

It should frankly be said that even in our country some people thought it a utopian idea, a sort of civitas solis. The near-completion of an agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles proves that the policy initiated then was correct. The January 15 statement was followed by the Reykjavik summit, and the latter by substantive talks on a wide range of issues - talks that are expected to culminate in the Washington summit on December 7.

Another reason for the change lies in U.S. policy. Many U.S. leaders are beginning to understand that there are limits to their country's potential. This also applies to economic potential. Many have realized that superarmament does not equal security. Moscow and Washington are talking more and more often about stability, pointing out that it is the criterion whereby not only military and strategic but also political relations between the two countries should be assessed.

Stability, in the broad sense of the word, should also include the promotion of economic relations. I think pure diplomacy, however clever it may be, is not enough in building relations with other countries. Take for instance the European and Asian countries. Relations with them are very often based on a combination of trade and cultural ties. In our relations with the United States, however, everything centres chiefly on the problem of security.

Don't the Americans reproach us with this at various talks?

They are putting the emphasis on other issues, and we agree with them. I think it is difficult to fix priorities in Soviet-American relations and say: the economy comes second, culture third, human rights fourth, regional problems fifth, and so on. All this plainly depends on the period in question and the combination should be determined by the specific situation. I often use the expression "the fabric of relations." Like a safety net at a circus, this fabric should keep relations from breaking down in a critical situation. It is therefore necessary to constantly strengthen this fabric in every possible way.

Mention should clearly be made of confidence - a cardinal issue in Soviet-American relations. Perhaps it is the most important cord in the safety net.

Leaving Soviet-American relations aside for a moment, I would like to ask you a question which is perhaps a little naive but which is raised increasingly frequently in letters from our readers. There are a number of pressing issues at home. Are

not foreign affairs given too much attention?

I would reply in this way: the people and the national economy have to pay a very high price for a bad foreign policy, mainly because such a policy does not ensure the peaceful development of the international situation. A tense situation leads to arms buildup and calls for the exertion of efforts and the diversion to other purposes of funds needed for the main branches of the economy. A bad policy also exerts psychological pressure on the nation and has an adverse effect on public feeling.

Domestic and foreign policies are like Siamese twins. A sound economy is, in my opinion, an earnest of a successful policy. Some of our economic difficulties are like fetters on our foreign policy. We would perhaps advance more rapidly in a number of fields if progress in them were not hindered by the shortcomings of our economic policy.

For instance, the situation in Soviet-American relations would be greatly facilitated by successes in our agriculture. At present we have to buy a certain amount of grain from the United States. Perhaps this is expedient from the economic point of view, but from the political point of view it would be better to do without these purchases.

How are new features of our domestic policy manifested concretely in our foreign policy?

They are manifested primarily in the overall sense of freedom of manoeuvre in seeking solutions, the boldness of decisions, and independence in decision-making.

In the past, we had little choice in seeking answers to problems, as we felt the pressure of long-standing traditions. Incidentally, many of these traditions, many of which are of undeniable value, have been preserved to this day, for diplomacy is a profession that observes traditions. Nevertheless, I repeat, the general atmosphere of freedom helps us find unexpected, very useful and very advantageous solutions. Soviet foreign policy is also directly influenced by one more feature of our present life, namely dynamism.

In a talk with George Shultz recently Mikhail Gorbachev described the present phase in Soviet-American relations as one of dynamization. This is also manifested in our ties with other countries. We at the Foreign Ministry have learned with surprise that a number of steps over the last two years were unprecedented in the history of Soviet diplomacy. For instance, the first visit by a Soviet Foreign Minister to Mongolia, and the first to Mexico over the 50 years of diplomatic relations with that country.

What is Soviet diplomacy, or rather Soviet foreign policy, lacking today? Flexibility perhaps? Do you think that, especially at negotiations, we have often driven ourselves into a corner by initially adopting a tough stand and retreating from it some time later, by linking several issues together in a package and then unlinking them? Perhaps our method of negotiation has become outdated, and it is a question merely of technique?

This question should be examined more carefully. First of all, firmness and flexibility are not synonymous, nor are they mutually exclusive. As for toughness and flexibility, they are indeed diametrically opposed. Firmness in policy - I think this applies to diplomacy too - means steadfastly advancing to the goal that has been set. Flexibility is a method with which this goal can be achieved. Firmness can be combined with a certain flexibility. Sometimes it is advisable to take one step back in order then to take two steps forward.

I would put the question you have raised as follows: before any negotiations, or in the course of evaluating relations with one or other country, it is very important clearly to define the goal of policy which should be based on the explicitly determined interests of the state. These interests are sometimes influenced by emotional responses to developments in the international situation. An emotional response may, in its turn, provoke a sharp counter-response that will subsequently be deplored.

So, a cool-headed, well-balanced approach is absolutely essential in foreign policy, as is the importance of balancing one's interests against those of other countries. It is aptly said that diplomacy is the art of the possible. We are trying to take as many factors as possible into account and, as in chess, to look several moves ahead.

Are you managing to do that?

Well, we are trying to do our best. Among the factors contributing to our efforts I would note the present atmosphere of innovation and creativity in the analysis of problems. It is impossible to build a policy on the basis of a single option available at a given moment. There must be several options. You compare all of them, from the worst to the best, and choose a policy that is usually close to what is called the golden mean.

This means you choose the optimal policy?

In foreign policy it is difficult to choose the line that will smoothly reach the target you have set, influenced as it is by a great many extraneous forces. For this reason a number of decisions have clearly not been optimal.

For instance?

Somewhat different calculations could have been made, in my opinion, when our security goals on the European continent were being defined. I feel that the effective development of our technology rather than political analysis influenced the adoption of some decisions. Take medium-range missiles, for instance. We had quite enough SS-4 and SS-5 missiles in Europe. Then we began to deploy SS-20s. Technically, they are more perfect. But the question is how they fitted into our military-strategic concept in the European theatre. I repeat: national interests must determine strategy, while strategy must determine political tactics and, to a certain extent, the technological development of the armed forces.

Let us turn to the latest events - the recent meetings between the Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers in Moscow and Washington. For the journalists present at the Shultz-Shevardnadze press conference in Moscow, things looked like this: the interests of the sides did not coincide and their views had not drawn closer. This disappointed the journalists, for they had been particularly expecting an announcement about a new summit meeting. But a week later they learned of the triumph of political realism in Washington. Does that mean the positions have changed?

The journalists were disappointed because the main thing for them was the date of a summit. This is an important factor, of course. The most important thing, however, is the content of a third summit with the U.S. President, the objectives both leaders will be trying to achieve.

Two concepts of the summit actually came together in Moscow, but they did not coincide. In a talk with Shultz last April, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the sides complete the drafting of a treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles and lay the basis for a future agreement on strategic offensive weapons. It was also proposed in April that the key provisions of such an accord could be worked out.

The concept brought by Shultz and Carlucci to Moscow in October included the signing of a treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles and an impressive list of ceremonies. But it pushed into the background the question of a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, agreement on which had been reached in principle in Reykjavik.

Since a single concept and the agenda of talks were not agreed on in Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev told George Shultz that he would sent a personal letter to Ronald Reagan to explain once again how he (Gorbachev) saw his future meeting with the President. The letter was written very quickly, and the Soviet Foreign Minister was instructed to hand it to the President with an additional explanation of our concept.

Why, nevertheless, was the date of a summit announced in Washington? In the U.S. capital we conducted intensive talks on the basis of Mikhail Gorbachev's letter, and the sides finally agreed that, first, it would be a businesslike visit with a tight schedule and, secondly, attention would be focussed on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. To be sure, the concept of a reduction of these weapons arose both in Moscow and

Washington. The Soviet Union believes that it is impossible to make such drastic cuts and not guarantee security with an appropriate system of stability provided by observance of the ABM treaty.

A new discussion over the ABM treaty began. It was agreed in Washington that the two sides will also thrash out the question of non-withdrawal from the treaty (that is, for a certain agreed period they will renounce the right to withdraw from it) and of observance of it in the future. I emphasize these words, because it took us several hours to discuss one word, "observance," which was then included in a joint communiqué. We have not yet reached agreement on the term "non-withdrawal," but it will be a subject of future talks.

And, finally, the main thing: we have agreed - on the basis of the idea formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev last April - that the two leaders will lay some of the groundwork for a future treaty on strategic offensive weapons. In the past, we called this groundwork the key provisions of a future treaty. But this time we used a new euphemism: instructions for the delegations. In effect, it is one and the same thing. In other words, the concept put forward by us in April has been adopted by the American side, and that is why the date of a summit has become real.

In connection with the Washington talks, some Western journalists are writing about a "softening" of the Soviet position on the SDI. At the same time, both sides stressed that none of them had made concessions on this question. Where is the truth?

First of all, SDI is an American programme, which is not a subject of our negotiations. The Americans claim that they are conducting research in this field. We are working out countermeasures - asymmetrical and cheaper ones. They are not a subject of negotiations either. But there is something that we can and must talk about - and that is a system of stability guarantees provided by the ABM treaty, which forbids certain actions.

If we reach agreement on non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty for a definite period of time, it will guarantee a stability on the basis of which a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons can be effected. In the West, many switch the talk about guarantees through strengthening the ABM treaty to another subject: do we or do we not agree with SDI and will we soften our position on this programme? I can say that, regardless of talks, our position is absolutely clear: SDI, if practical steps were taken to implement it, would run counter to the ABM treaty.

But the Americans have already begun to create it.

What do you mean by saying "create"? Nobody has as yet begun to create the system in real terms, and in general, SDI as a concept, is visibly undergoing a transformation. For instance, the programme Ronald Reagan spoke of in 1983 is no longer accepted as real even in the United States. This can be concluded from the recent reports of American physicists and the statements of some administration officials. This means that something else will be developed - SDI-2, as some people say. Something, but not an impenetrable shield over the United States.

The Americans are spreading a powerful campaign of misinformation about their SDI programme trying to produce in our country a feeling of being greatly threatened and to direct our scientific and technological thought into a blind alley. But today we know well enough what they are really talking about. That is why we are working on countermeasures that could be produced if SDI is brought to fruition. But I stress once again: this can and must be avoided.

Nevertheless, at the previous summit meetings, both we and Americans spoke about SDI. Perhaps our position has changed.

We spoke about SDI as a threat to the ABM treaty. This treaty, which we must preserve and strictly observe, has always been in the centre of negotiations. That is the key to understanding the situation.

But the Americans have been returning to the question of the SDI, and we have made a sort of technical adjustment to the Soviet position on tests in outer space.

The ABM treaty does not ban absolutely everything. It forbids the creation of anti-missile defence in space, as well as land-mobile defence, anti-missile defence for the entire territory of a country, and so on. Nevertheless, extensive work is being carried out in space, and not only for peaceful exploration. Military satellites, technical reconnaissance and communication satellites have been launched in space. We have proposed to the Americans that a list be compiled of devices that would be banned from space. Theoretically, a device not included in the list could be put in space. The Americans pretend not to understand the pragmatic logic of this approach. At the talks in Washington last September we proposed to determine, in addition to the list of devices, their parameters and the levels of their technical specifications. Devices with characteristics below these levels could be tested, as the ABM treaty does not extend to them.

Do you think an agreement on strategic offensive weapons possible? How important is the question of sublevels? Is it a stumbling block?

A treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of stratetic offensive weapons is possible. However, a strong political impulse in the form of instructions to the delegations should be given to it at the forthcoming meeting in Washington. It will, of course, be necessary to solve problems involving the structure of the strategic triads.

We proceed above all from the fact that the triads have evolved historically, and the sides have different geopolitical positions. It is impossible to cut the same suit for two men with completely different figures. That is why our arsenals, being different in their structures, need different internal configurations. But this does not mean we are opposed to fixing some levels for the concentration of warheads on the three principal elements of the strategic triad.

The Soviet position on sublevels is therefore determined by the "different suits" approach.

Exactly. We have offered the Americans a neat diplomatic solution to the problem by proposing a numerical range for each element of the triad: from 3,000 to 3,300 warheads on land-based ballistic missiles; from 1,800 to 2,000 warheads on submarine-based ballistic missiles, and from 800 to 900 warheads on air-based cruise missiles. One should have the wit to find the combination of warheads acceptable to both sides.

But the Americans today have considerably fewer warheads on their intercontinental ballistic missiles.

That is their business. For instance, they have more warheads on their submarine-launched ballistic missiles. There will be one level for both the Soviet Union and the United States - 6,000. The Americans bored us with their talk about sublevels. We told them: you want sublevels, here they are. It only remains now to take calculators or electronic computers, check strategic doctrines, plans and policy with their help, and offer each other mutually acceptable figures.

One more question. Why are sea-based cruise missiles not mentioned in connection with negotiations? Is there tacit agreement between the sides in this respect?

There is no such agreement. We have always spoken about these missiles.

Why then are they not mentioned in the latest Soviet proposal on sublevels?

This is simply because you did not have the chance to read the verbatim report on the talks. The question of limits for sea-based cruise missiles is an absolutely indispensable and crucial aspect of any treaty on strategic offensive weapons. We cannot permit a situation where - with a 50 per cent reduction of the triad - this type of weapon is left aside. At the Reykjavik summit the sides agreed in principle that, in addition to a 50 per cent reduction, limits will also be set for sea-based cruise missiles. We are now talking about a definite and compulsory limitation of these missiles.

Regardless of a 50 per cent reduction?

The limitation of sea-based cruise missiles will accompany a 50 per cent reduction, as they are not included in the 6,000 warheads.

Is it planned to cut the number of sea-based cruise missiles by half, like all other weapons?

It is impossible to cut it by half, as this programme is only beginning to develop.

In other words, we want to fix the ceiling?

That's right. The Americans are planning to build 4,000 sea-based cruise missiles, most of them with nuclear warheads. A sharply reduced level, equal for both sides, must be fixed for these strategic nuclear-tipped missiles.

In retaliation to the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe, we have installed our operational-tactical missiles in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic and moved our submarines closer to the U.S. shores. Where will these submarines go if the appropriate agreements are signed?

The submarines are a reaction to the overall strategic situation that would arise if the United States deployed all its medium-range and cruise missiles in Europe. As for the Soviet shorter-range missiles sited in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, last April I went to these countries as a representative of the Soviet leadership to sound out their attitude to the inspections that will be required at the time of dismantling the missiles on their territories. Our allies have supported us.

Let us return to summit meetings. What makes them important? Why do we not hold them more often if, as the past few years have shown, they really help to bring about a certain relaxation in the international situation?

Well, it is a very important aspect. The top leaders indeed take a broader view of the world situation and a statesmanlike approach to the interests of their respective countries. This is one of the paramount aspects of their meetings. Secondly, they seem to predetermine the prospective strategy of mutual relations. Thirdly, personal meetings help them better to understand each other's way of thinking. They increase trust and lessen the likelihood of mistakes. Fourthly, the top leaders demonstrate to their countries and the whole world that the Soviet Union and the United States want to establish civilized relations. So, summits are very important as a symbol. In the present circumstances, I think, they are a very important form of diplomatic activity as such.

This means the top leaders should meet more frequently.

I think this is the present trend. High-level meetings with the Americans have, in fact, been held every year in the recent period - 1985, 1986, 1987. Each of these meetings has not only advanced our relations and made our world a safer place to live in. It has given the world hopes of a tranquil future. ■

THE CONGRESS AND REFORMS

The 13th Congress of the Communist Party of China, held recently in Peking, has attracted widespread attention. Some 300 foreign correspondents arrived in China to report on the proceedings. As usual, foreign delegations were not invited. Had that rule not been applied, it is likely that far more guests would have attended the congress.

That a CPC congress should arouse keen interest worldwide is not surprising. First, China is a great power whose influence in world affairs continues to increase. Any political event in China, and especially a congress of its ruling party, is certain to have repercussions worldwide. Second, with its membership of roughly 46 million, the CPC is the world's largest Communist Party.

The prospects of the international communist movement as a whole depend to no small extent on what line is adopted by the CPC. Heightened interest in the Chinese communist forum is also explained by the process of extensive reforms now being carried out in that country. Today China is a tremendous laboratory where an intensive search for effective ways of upgrading the economy, social relations and the socialist political system is being conducted.

Achievements and problems

Perhaps it is too early to assess the final results. But one thing is clear: the questions raised at the congress have repercussions that go far beyond the immediate concerns of Chinese Communists.

The 13th Congress can be characterized in a nutshell as a congress of reforms. China embarked on a course of reform nine years ago at the Central Committee's third plenum of the eleventh convocation in 1978. In subsequent years reforms have been carried out in ever new spheres of domestic life and foreign policy activity.

The introduction of a contract system in the countryside, the transfer of most agricultural machines to peasants for their personal use, the abolition of the centralized state purchase of the majority of farm products, granting peasants the right to market their surplus commodities and other measurese have given a fillip to agricultural production.

During the previous five-year-plan period (1981-85), the volume of agricultural production increased, on average, by 8.1 per cent a year. Bumper harvests of cereal and other crops were brought in. The food supply to the urban population improved considerably, and the real incomes of the rural population rose by 14 per cent a year.

At the same time the potential of small peasant farms for the further expansion of production will evidently soon be exhausted. The harvests of cereal crops dropped slightly in 1985 and 1986 as some peasants had turned to growing crops yielding bigger profits. There has arisen a gap between the incomes of rich and less successful peasants and, as a result, friction between them in some areas.

Thanks to the reforms, industrial output has been increasing rapidly (by an average 12 per cent a year), and unemployment has dropped significantly. But, simultaneously, in a number of areas planned targets have not been fulfilled, financial discipline has relaxed, and efficiency of production and quality of goods have declined. Profiteering, bribery and embezzlement of state property have been recorded.

Since the late 1970s, Peking has been encouraging foreign investment. Special economic zones have been created for foreign investors, and broad rights granted to them in the establishment of various enterprises on Chinese soil. This policy has proved effective. Suffice it to say that in the 1980s China has received over 55 billion dollars in the form of credits and direct investment, of which 32 billion have already been put to use.

Some 14,000 units of modern equipment worth 12 billion dollars have been imported, and agreements have been concluded for the setting up of 8,900 enterprises with the participation of foreign capital. In the opinion of local economists, new industries, such as the manufacture of computers and colour TV sets, have been built in China thanks to the assistance of other countries. The aircraft and motorcar industries have been modernized, and an impulse has been given to the development of chemical, ferrous metallurgy and power industries, and transport.

But, it is noted in China, bourgeois ideology is also getting in through the open doors. Some people, mostly the young, are beginning to voice doubts about the advantages of socialism. Even more tenacious is left-wing deviation. The deviationists refuse to accept the new

ideas in the party's economic policy and cling to outdated ideological dogmas. Heated discussions on the urgent problems of socialist construction are being held in the country.

The strategy of development

The 13th Congress was to review and assess the experience gained in the course of the reforms over the past nine years, and work out a strategy of development for the future. The Central Committee report, delivered by acting general secretary Zhao Ziyang, stated that events had vindicated the policy charted by the third plenum in 1978.

The theoretical propositions of the congress and its approach to China's vital problems were expressed in three basic conclusions.

The first conclusion says that Marxism, being a dialectical science, "needs substantial revision." In the process of building a new society, Zhao Ziyang said, "some of our predecessors' tenets, containing utopian elements in view of their historical limitations, must inevitably be dropped, dogmatic interpretations of Marxism and erroneous ideas ascribed to it must be rejected, and the theory of scientific socialism must be developed further in the light of new experience."

The Communist Party, it was stated at the congress, will, in future too, strive to combine Marxism with the realities obtaining in the country and in this way build a socialism with specific Chinese features. The CPC admitted again its left-deviationist errors in the past, which "hindered the growth of the productive forces and socialist commodity production." It was noted that deviations still remained in the party. The greatest danger is represented by the left-wing deviation, which gives a rigidly dogmatic interpretation of Marxism and is opposed to reform. The deviations will be combated not by means of political campaigns, as sometimes happened in the past, but by means of "positive education and proper criticism."

The CPC's problems - putting ideological obstacles in the way of reforms - seem relevant to the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union amongst them, which are also carrying out reforms.

The second conclusion defines the criteria for the activity of a political party. "The role the policy and activity of one or other political party of China plays, whether it is positive or negative," the Central Committee report says, "is determined in the long run by whether the policy and activity of a party contribute to the growth of the productive forces of the Chinese people."

The expansion of the productive forces, it is further stated in the report, is "the immediate and most important task" of the CPC, and everything that helps to achieve it "meets the vital interests of the people and is therefore dictated and permitted by socialism." The failure to apply this criterion and the evaluation of developments as prescribed by abstract principles and utopian models can only discredit Marxism, Zhao Ziyang pointed out.

The relevance of this conclusion extends beyond China, though it has primarily its own, purely Chinese implications - in the 1960s and 1970s the CPC followed a policy of intensified class struggle and virtually ignored the interests of production and the material needs of the people.

The third conclusion defines the present stage of China's development. "China is now going through the initial stage of socialism," the report says. "In our country socialism has grown out of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, and in the level of development of our productive forces we are far behind the industrial capitalist states. This circumstance has made it necessary for us to go through a rather long initial stage of development in the course of which we have to industrialize the country, and commercialize, socialize and modernize production, that is, do what many other countries have done in conditions of capitalism."

The initial stage of socialism, it was emphasized at the congress, is a special period in China, an Asian country which is building a new society in the context of backward productive forces (China still holds one of the world's lowest places in the per capita share of the gross national product). The initial stage of socialism, the report said, would last for a minimum of 100 years, starting with the 1950s when the socialization of private ownership of the means of production completed.

If such a conclusion had been reached earlier, say in the late 1950s, and if the CPC had been constantly guided by this conclusion in its policy, China would have avoided many negative phenomena engendered by attempts to outpace the course of events as well as by distortions in the economic and political fields (the "great leap forward," the "communes," and the "cultural revolution"). The above-mentioned conclusion of the 13th Congress will perhaps be received with interest in other socialist countries, especially in Asia, where the conditions are similar to those in China.

Following its conclusion on the initial stage of socialism, the CPC chooses appropriate methods of development. The party has theoretically proved that socialism cannot be built on enthusiasm alone or by injunction, that property cannot be completely socialized, and that the laws of commodity production must not be violated and small producers-owners ousted from it.

The creation of an economic mechanism that would integrate planning with the market, that is, become a mechanism for the "state regulation of the market and the market orientation of the economy," the congress reaffirmed, will continue to be the main direction of the transformation of society. The party considers it necessary, with public ownership retaining the leading positions, further to expand the multistructural economy of China, in particular to promote cooperatives and other forms of private enterprise in town and countryside.

The aim is to encourage - while not permitting a dramatic contrast between wealth and poverty - more rapid growth in the well-being of those who work conscientiously and run their farms or businesses in accordance with the law. Great importance is also attached to the market orientation of state-owned enterprises by going over to macroeconomic regulation, indirect management, and planning based on the exchange of commodities and the law of value.

Basis for cooperation

As was mentioned above, China began to carry out reforms in the late 1970s. It should be admitted in this connection that only recently, until the April 1985 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, many certain experiments and reforms in the Chinese economy had been regarded in the Soviet Union with some scepticism. This was the result of friction in Soviet-Chinese relations and the fact that the Soviet economy was run by other methods.

The situation changed after the 27th Congress of the CPSU, the subsequent plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee, and especially after its June plenum this year. The Soviet Union has embarked on a course of introducing forms of economic management combining planning with market orientation, and encouraging cooperative and individual forms of labour.

The Chinese experience is not entirely suited to our conditions, as the Soviet Union is at a higher stage of development. But the difference in methods of economic policy is no longer, and nor can it be, a reason for estrangement between the CPSU and the CPC. On the contrary, both parties want to raise socialism in their countries to a higher level, and this community of goals provides a firm basis for cooperation, studying each other's experience, and mutual support. Every success of either of the two states increases the common potential of the socialist system and makes socialism more attractive in the eyes of people the world over.

It was repeatedly stated at the Chinese Communists' forum that in the modern world no country can develop effectively behind closed doors. This is especially true of China. Only attracting technology and capital from abroad can China "gradually reduce the distance between it and the industrialized nations."

The congress defined specific forms of expanding cooperation with other countries. In particular, business ties are to be promoted with both industrial and developing states. Worthy of note is the intention of Chinese leaders to set up economic zones where foreign investors

will be accorded favourable treatment.

Partnership with foreign companies is a field where other socialist countries can learn much that is useful for themselves from Chinese experience. This includes the establishment of joint ventures and special economic zones, the opening of channels for the export of manufactured goods to the industrialized capitalist countries, and the settlement of issues involved in the transfer of advanced technology.

Reform of the political structure

The reform of the political structure of society was described at the congress as an important aspect of the CPC's activity at the present stage. The long-term goal of the reform is "to create a viable socialist political system with highly developed democracy, perfect law and order, and high efficiency."

China should ultimately build a democracy "more advanced and effective than in the capitalist states," the report says. This does not mean imitating Western models. The aim is to develop socialist democracy with Chinese features.

The congress documents indicate that the reform of the political structure will have limited aims in the near future and should be carried out cautiously, step by step, under firm guidance, smoothly and reliably, so as not to upset stability and hinder the unity of the party. Despite these reservations, however, the congress envisaged a wide range of far-reaching reforms of a political character.

Worthy of note are decisions that strictly determine the functions of party and government bodies. Zhao Ziyang described this measure as "the cornerstone of the reform of the political structure." It was pointed out at the congress that the party must conduct its activity within the framework of the Constitution and other laws and translate its plans into government decisions by carrying out explanatory work in party organizations.

Of course, the congress's decisions on the delimitation of the functions of party and government bodies are merely a guideline so far, and the elaboration of concrete measures is still a matter for the future.

The restructuring of the government bodies, which has been under way for several years but has not yet brought radical changes, will be continued. Much attention was devoted by the congress to improving the institutions of socialist political democracy, and especially, the assemblies of people's representatives.

Political reforms will begin with the CPC. The congress decided that the system of collective leadership and democratic centralism should be improved from top to bottom. From now on, more than one candidate will be nominated for election to every post in all party bodies, the Central Committee included.

The congress itself was proof of real progress in the democratization of party life. It was held in an atmosphere of openness.

Foreign policy programme

Foreign observers had been awaiting with especial impatience the publication of the congress's foreign policy programme. It proved somewhat brief (only a few paragraphs) but promising in content. The Chinese leadership confirmed that it "will continue steadfastly to pursue a peaceful and independent foreign policy based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and to establish relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries."

The congress welcomed the Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles and the improvement of the climate in East-West relations. The Central Committee's report did not contain the previously repeated statements about "the clash between the two superpowers (the Soviet Union and the United States - E.S.) for world hegemony" and the "three obstacles" to Sino-Soviet relations. The tact shown on these issues is significant, though a highly-placed spokesman for the Chinese leadership noted in an interview that "no big changes are expected in the foreign policy of China."

It can therefore be concluded that certain differences in the Chinese and Soviet approaches to international problems will apparently remain. This concerns first of all the Afghan and Kampuchean problems. But it is also evident that the general line of China's foreign policy meets the vital interests of peace and socialism. The party's policy of modernization also demonstrates the interest of Chinese Communists in a relaxation of tension, disarmament, the solution of conflicts, and normal relations with all countries.

Also noteworthy is the fact that the CPC, as evidenced by the congress documents, is not going to stop at the level of theoretical perception of problems it has attained. Zhao Ziyang emphasized that many aspects of the party's policy, political guidelines and theoretical theses need to be further improved. "Our notions of contradictions in development and inherent features of the present period are imperfect and superficial," he said. The Chinese leader urged the theorists to adhere in their studies to the line: "let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools compete."

The composition of the party's leading bodies was considerably renewed by the congress. However, the veterans remain on duty. As a spokesman of the 13th Congress press centre declared, Deng Xiaoping, for instance, would play an important role in party and government affairs.

The Chinese Communists and the entire people of the country will have to work hard to put the congress's decisions into effect.

EVGENY SEVASTYANOV

PEOPLE ON THE WORLD SCENE

THE NOVEMBER 2 PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ELECTED ZHAO ZIYANG GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

ZHAO ZIYANG



Zhao Ziyang was born in 1919 in Henan Province. At 18, while still studying, he joined the revolutionary struggle led by the Communist Party of China. In 1938 he was admitted to the party. For over ten years, during the war of resistance against the Japanese invaders and the war of liberation, he headed a district and then an area committee of the party in Central China.

In the early 1960s Zhao Ziyang was first secretary of the Guangdong provincial committee of the party and a member of the secretariat of the Central Committee Bureau for Central and South China.

During the "cultural revolution" he was subjected to repression and sent to work in a factory. In 1971 he returned to party work, holding leading posts in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and in the Guandgond and Sichuan provinces, serving as a political commissar in Guangzhou military district and as first political commissar in the Chengdu military district of the People's Liberation Army of China.

In August of 1977 Zhao Ziyang was elected an alternate and, two years later, a full member of the CPC Political Bureau, and in 1980 he was coopted to its Standing Committee. In the same year he became premier of the State Council of the republic. In 1981 Zhao Ziyang was elected deputy chairman of the CPC Central Committee and in January 1987 appointed acting general secretary of the CPC Central Committee.

Compiled from Xinhua news reports

Why have they left?

●ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, EX-U.S. SERVICEMAN WADE E. ROBERTS WAS ARRESTED BY AMERICAN MILITARY POLICE WITHIN HOURS OF HIS ARRIVAL IN FRANKFORT ON THE MAIN FROM MOSCOW.

It happened shortly before midnight in the part of Frankfort patronized by pleasure-seeking American soldiers. According to an AP report, Roberts offered no resistance to arrest.

The reason Roberts and his girl friend Petra Neumann found themselves in the limelight was that they had asked for political asylum in the U.S.S.R. last spring. The request was granted by the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet on April 2, 1987. Since then, Petra and Wade had lived in Ashkhabad, the city of their choice.

How did Roberts explain his reasons for leaving our country? I had a talk with the couple in a room in the Budapest Hotel two hours before their departure from Moscow by plane.

"Our decision to leave the Soviet Union has created quite a stir. But there is a big difference between the reasons that brought us here and the reasons for which we are leaving. I came here fleeing the persecutions I had been subjected to in the U.S. army. They had tried to make me into a mindless robot. I did not regret having come to the Soviet Union. The people here are not the bloodthirsty monsters the Western press alleges them to be. Right from the start we did not know exactly how long we'd stay in the Soviet Union - for a few months or longer. So there are no political motives behind our departure. "Petra and I have not registered our marriage, and she's pregnant. Besides, she has left her husband behind in the F.R.G. In Ashkhabad we had problems registering the baby. We were told this could be done only on condition that we were officially married, which did not suit us. There were other motives, too."

Roberts said that having the baby delivered was their chief concern. In Petra Neumann's opinion, Soviet maternity hospitals differed from those in the West: the father is not allowed to be present at childbirth here.

"I don't think I'll be able to go back to the States. Some people may wish to put me behind bars there. So I want to thrash all these questions out with the American authorities' representatives in the F.R.G.," Roberts said. "All the stories circulated by the media (the BBC, for instance) about me having been banished to Ashkhabad by force and my rights being infringed upon are false.

"We have made many friends in the Soviet Union. All of them understood our decision. I don't think I'm leaving the U.S.S.R. for good. I plan to come here again. So far I don't know how our life will work out in the F.R.G. We'll probably come up against a lot of problems right away. I'd like to write a book about our life in your country...."

As I walked out of the hotel, I saw a group of CNN cameramen waiting to take pictures of Petra and Wade leaving the hotel and boarding the plane. Later they accompanied the couple to Frankfort.

MIKHAIL SVETLICHNY

SPAIN - U.S.A.

No to U. S. bases

●THE LATEST U.S. ATTEMPT TO RETAIN ITS BASES IN SPAIN HAS ENDED IN FAILURE.

If Madrid and Washington prove unable to settle their differences before May 14, 1988, the United States will have to dismantle all its bases and strongholds on Spanish territory within the next twelve months. That is the result of the seventh round of Spanish-American talks on the reduction of the United States military presence.

The Socialist government led by Felipe Gonzalez is compelled to take into account the fact that at the referendum in March 1986 the majority of Spaniards agreed to the country's membership of NATO on three conditions: 1) that Madrid would not participate in the bloc's military organization; 2) that Spain would not accept nuclear weapons on its soil; 3) that the numerical strength of the American forces, which entered the country in Franco's time "like an occupating rather than a liberating army" (to quote F. Gonzalez), would be drastically reduced.

Threats by Congress to cut back by half the U.S. annual aid to Spain (415 million dollars) proved of no avail, nor did the tough line taken by Washington, or the compromises proposed. Having lost about a million votes at the June 1987 elections, and its majority on the municipal councils, the Socialists cannot afford any unpopular measures. Hence the Gonzalez cabinet's emphasis on firmness at the talks.

The government's No came at a most inappropriate moment for the United States. The Pentagon was already planning, as a sort of compensation for the forthcoming elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, to deploy a new type of air and sea-based nuclear weapons at its bases in Europe (details are so far being kept secret). This explains why the U.S. is clinging so desperately to its bases in Spain, and in particular the bases in Torrejon de Ardoz and Saragossa.

The bases are also important to the United States as they block the exit from the Western Mediterranean (support for the 6th Fleet, communications, intelligence, and material-and-technical supplies). As France does not allow American fighter planes in, the Spanish bases are crucial in backing up American and NATO forces in Turkey, Greece, Italy, and for U.S. strategy (including Israel) in the Middle East.

There are virtually no alternatives, remarked the Baltimore Sun, adding salt to the wound. Portugal? Lisbon would accept planes on the Azores, but only NATO not American units. But even that would not resolve the problem, as the F-16 cannot reach the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece? Out of the question: Athens has long been threatening to close down U.S. bases on its territory. Sicily: perfect - but unrealistic. Rome is already doing a great deal by making Naples available to the 6th Fleet. Turkey? It's saturated with NATO and U.S. bases. Morocco and Malta? Rabat, according to the Baltimore Sun, will not play ball. But, the paper advises, it would be worth sounding out Valletta, as a new conservative government has taken over there....

In the meantime, attempts are already being made to put pressure on Spain from the outside - from other NATO members, and from the inside - brainwashing ministers and the military. As the example of neighbouring Italy shows, one cannot rule out the use of such a lever of pressure as terrorism, which is stepped up with an amazing degree of coincidence when differences within NATO reach a peak.

LEV MAKAREVICH

WINNERS OF NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL QUIZ

1917–1987

held to mark the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution

The editors received 1,268 letters and parcels from 62 countries in all continents. The largest number of replies - 397 - came from Vietnam. The next in the amount of mail were the German Democratic Republic (298), Cuba (216), Italy (82) and India (54).

The first prize went to

1. Rolando Ardiles Diaz. Havana, Cuba (teacher)

2. Himadri Majumdar. Calcutta, India (student)

3. Christian Pagneux. Beaurepaire, France (worker in the chemical industry).

Three winners, though only two top prizes - visits to the Soviet Union - were announced. For a long time preference was given to Rolando Diaz and Himadri Majumdar. But when the jury received a parcel from Christian Pagneux, they could not but institute a third top prize. Three truly splendid works.

The second prize went to

1. Nguyen Thi Ve. Hanoi, Vietnam (transistor radio)

2. M. Mahboob Alam. Karachi, Pakistan (decorative Palekh box)

3. Alexis J. Rodriguez Leon. Villa Clara, Cuba (transistor radio)

4. Jaime Zumaya Vega. Mexico City, Mexico (decorative Palekh box)

The third prize went to

1. Trinh Duy Tien. Nam Ninh, Vietnam (a transistor radio)

2. Ana Mirtha Trujillo Matarreyes, La Caridad (electric samovar)

3. Uwe Garten. Wunschendorf, G.D.R. (electric samovar)

4. Phan Ngoc Thuan. Da Nang, Vietnam (transistor radio)

5. Hoang Nam Hai. Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (transistor radio)

6. Vasile Dumitriescu. Suceava, Romania (electric samovar)

7. Vicente Bonilla Fernandez. Badajoz, Spain (electric samovar)

8. Aracelis Pineda Rodriguez. Holguin, Cuba (electric samovar)

Sixty consolation prizes (handicraft goods of various kinds) will be received by

Angola: Jose Bunga, Luanda
Afghanistan: Asmatullah Magidi, Kabul
Mohammad Nasim, Kabul
Bangladesh: Sadiq Ahmed, Dhaka
Brazil: Dina Lida Kinoshita, Sao Paulo
Canada: Sonia Rutka, Penticton
Cuba: Alberto Artiles Mendoza, Cienfuegos
Caridad Luisa Gremps Limonta, Havana
Mivaldo Hernandez Hernandez, Santa Clara
Enrique Valdes Hernandez, Havana
Luis Teruel Leyva, Holguin
Luis Enrique Silva Carmona, Pinar del Rio
Nilka Valledor Soler, Matanzas
Elsa Milvian Pasto Pasto, Santiago de Cuba
Ruben Ernesto del Sol Valdes, S. Spiritus
Maria Mendoza del Pino, Camagüey
Rafael Gonzalez Quesada, Camagüey
Mirtha Sanchez Bruzon, Santiago de Cuba
Armando Cespedes Calperin, Santiago de Cuba
Jose Felipe Garcia Montero, Camagüey
Armando Juan Quiala, Guantanamo
Elleny Suarez Basulto, Camagüey
Fidel Remesal Avila, Ciego de Avila
Marianela Pena Lora, Santiago de Cuba
Edmundo Gonzalez Castillo, S. Spiritus
Roberto Dorticos Cabrera, Palmira
Cyprus: Antonios Hadjiccos, Nicosia
G.D.R.: Manfred Berauer, Altenburg
Ranft Dirk, Löbau
Katja Pauly, Berlin
Bernd Roscher, Dresden
Manfred Donath, Potsdam
Spain: José Lozano Morales, Murcia
Ghana: Ebenezer-William Sowan, Accra
India: Girja Shanker Gupta, Jhansi
Suma Angel, Madras
Herbert Roland Fernandes, Maharashtra
Dibyendu Roy, Ranaghat
Henry Joseph, Andhra Pradesh
Prasanta Kumar Nanda, Dhenkanal
Siddhartha Bhowmik, Calcutta
Bhimasen Maharana, Itamati
Italy: Luigi Fiumara, Gaeta
Jamaica: Sylvia Grodger-Wilson, St Cathrina
Kampuchea: Som Sarun, Pnompenh
Nepal: Bidur Chandra Shrestha, Katmandu
Austria: Hermann Einkemmer, Innsbruck
Peru: Ramiro Sanchez Navarro, Lima
Philippines: Joselito Sabal Policarpio, Bulacan
Glenn S. Ferolin, Iloilocity
Sierra Leone: D. Bangura, Freetown
Sri Lanka: A. Santhan, Manipay
U.S.A.: Larry Butterbrodt, Luck
Venezuela: Carlos R. Faria T., Caracas
Vietnam: Nguyen Dinh Quy, Nam Dinh
Nguyen Khanh Van, Bac-Thai
Bui Van Minh, Nghoa Binh
Bui Dep, Ho Chi Minh City
Dang Van Hung, Hanoi
Tr. M. Nguet, Hanoi

Eighteen members of the Italian Association for Cultural Ties with the Soviet Union - readers of our magazine - were awarded each a yearly subscription to New Times:

Giuseppe A. Malatino, Messina
Domenico Marrara, Reggio Calabria
Giovanni Chirico, Reggio Calabria
Sebastiano Macheda, Reggio Calabria
Salvatore Femia, Reggio Calabria
Domenico Lofaro, Triperi
Gaetano Morcante, Reggio Calabria
Salvatore Penna, Reggio Calabria
Domenico Argentino, Reggio Calabria
Filippo Piccione, Soriano Calabro
Giuseppe Tuxano, Reggio Calabria
Claudia Geracitano, Caulonia
Walter Rago, Reggio Calabria
Loredana Ponterio, Reggio Calabria
Maria Spato, Reggio Calabria
Franco Natale, Reggio Calabria
Luigi Narrapopi, Reggio Calabria
Grafiano Citelli, Reggio Calabria

The editors heartily welcome the winners and all others who took part in our quiz.

They treated her as their own

YULI VORONTSOV

On November 19, Indira Gandhi would have been 70. Her tragic death, and those treacherous shots in Delhi shook the world, so deservedly high was the political and personal authority of that remarkable woman, and so invariably noble were the goals towards which she had led her great country for more than 15 years.

My first meeting with Indira Gandhi took place in 1978 in extremely unusual circumstances - preparations were under way to send her to prison. The Janata Party government, then in office, had accused her of contempt of parliament. Her activities as Prime Minister were being investigated, and many of those with whom she had worked for years were giving her a wide berth. It was easy to imagine how she felt.

Strange as it may seem, I can't for the life of me remember how I had pictured Indira Gandhi before I actually met with her - evidently, the image had been overshadowed by her reputation as a major world figure, a political leader who enjoyed enormous international prestige. Moreover, I hadn't the slightest idea how our relations would develop: would I meet Indira Gandhi? Would she wish to see me? These doubts were dispelled - and very soon - by Indira Gandhi herself: the telephone rang and we agreed on a time for a meeting at the embassy. I saw a slender woman of medium height, who held herself simply and naturally. Sensing at the embassy the friendly atmosphere she was accustomed to, Indira Gandhi seemed to relax and we began to talk as old friends.

International problems, it should be said, interested her little at the time, even relations with the Soviet Union which she had always prized. Certainly by that time she would have known that the new government was keeping to the same policy in regard to our country.

She could not hide, or perhaps made no effort to hide, her bitterness and pain that she - who had done so much for India - now had to fend off petty attacks, and fabricated allegations. My impression was that what hurt her more than the defeat at the elections was the betrayal of those whom she had regarded as her friends and colleagues. Perhaps that is why she reacted with such warmth to another show of friendliness on the part of the official representative of a country with which India had had friendly relations for a long time.

Obviously we were all interested to know what would happen next. To tell the truth, Indira Gandhi pictured the future in a gloomy light, she spared no dark colours in her description of the new government, and what she feared most of all was that in its search for immediate gains it would throw away everything India had achieved with such great difficulty. In spite of being a strictly pragmatic person, she disliked the psychology of temporary gains.

In general, she combined pragmatism with unswerving adherence to principle. Later, when early in 1980 Indira Gandhi was triumphantly swept back into office, and firm cordial relations had by then been established between us, the kind of relations that made possible long conversations on a variety of subjects, we had one very interesting conversation. I shall not go into the details, they were not important. We were talking about India's decision to ask for a big loan, one which would lead to outside control over how the money would be used. I expressed my surprise and she replied: India at present urgently needs funds, and we shall permit only such control over their spending as will not be detrimental to the country's independence. The creditors won't like that and India will get no more loans from that source, she continued, but that can't be helped.

I should like to go back to the initial stages of our acquaintance, to Indira Gandhi's hard times, when she herself and her closest friends doubted whether she would be returned to office. Not to political life, it was quite clear that Indira would not leave politics, but whether she would become Prime Minister again. Probably few people believed in such a possibility. I want to go back to that time because it was then that I - for whom India was new - first felt and then realized fully that unique phenomenon - the close affinity between Indira Gandhi and the widest masses of the people. I shall not attempt to analyze the nature of this phenomenon: whether the people saw Indira as the personification of Mother India or as a daughter of India, for them she was **one of themselves.** And they treated her as their own. They could be hurt by her, they could grouse at her, and even vote against her - yet they still loved her.

In his Testament, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote of his love for India and how generously the Indian people had repaid his love with theirs. I believe that applies fully to his daughter as well.

Incidentally, when our conversations touched on the reasons for the defeat of the Indian National Congress (INC) at the 1977 elections, Indira Gandhi's conclusion could be summed up as follows: too little attention had been paid to the growth of political consciousness in the rural areas. Through inertia, it had been taken for granted that India's fate is decided in the towns, although it was the votes of the rural areas that had brought the Janata Party to power. Then almost three years later realizing that this coalition would get

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YULI VORONTSOV - First Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R.; Soviet ambassador to India in 1978-83.

them nowhere, rural voters brought Indira Gandhi back into office.

Although Indira Gandhi might have seemed a very restrained person, in reality she was very emotional and responded whole-heartedly to sincerity. I recall an incident that today makes one smile. When it seemed that nothing could prevent Indira Gandhi from being arrested, my wife, forgetting all the circumstances of time and place, said with a purely feminine approach: don't eat anything in prison, I will bring you food from home. Indira replied in the same vein: Thank you, but don't worry, my daughters-in-law will keep me supplied.

For a second I imagined the picture: the wife of the Soviet ambassador rushing to a prison with food for the former Prime Minister....

Indira Gandhi was a person of rare firmness and tremendous will power. At times it seemed to me that she was at her best in critical, extreme situations, when the only correct decision had to be made at once. It was not for nothing that a joke circulating in Delhi described Indira Gandhi as the only man in the government.

However, nothing feminine was alien to this "only man." Once a whole album of photographs of girls whom their parents had named Indira was sent from Moscow. You should have seen how carefully Indira Gandhi examined all her namesakes!

As I said, after Indira Gandhi returned to power we often met and talked on a variety of subjects. She always found time for such conversations. And there were no restrictions on what we could talk about. Indira Gandhi discussed all subjects frankly and in depth, with invariable good will and liveliness. As a rule, the foreign policy she pursued was close to us and something we could understand. This policy was prompted by the objective realities of international life and the realiability of partnership with the Soviet Union tested by experience.

Since winning independence forty years ago, India has travelled a truly colossal road, one of which she is justly proud. Our assistance, at the initial stage, played an immensely beneficial role in this. There should be no exaggeration: afterwards India built up her economy independently, but on a foundation that was laid jointly. In her public speeches Indira Gandhi often acknowledged the role Soviet assistance had played.

I should like to describe an incident I happened to witness. For a long time it was believed that no oil would be found in India. At any rate that was the conclusion the British reached (or pretended to reach?) after their geological surveys. It was Soviet geologists who made the big find and announced that the general prospects for India seemed very promising. This interested Indira Gandhi extremely, and she expressed the wish to learn more. At the time a representative group of Soviet oil prospectors was in the country and I was present at their meeting with Indira Gandhi. She questioned them minutely about every aspect. They laid out all their maps and showed the areas already surveyed and those as yet unsurveyed but which looked promising. They told her that on the whole it looked as if India's oil potential was big, and gave some approximate figures for oil production. Indira Gandhi carefully examined the charts, but remained silent, so that one of our people even asked me if she had understood. At this point, however, Indira began putting specific questions, asking what could be the maximum output and for how long the supplies would last if it was pumped at that rate. What worries me, she said, is how long the oil supplies will last, because no matter how vital our present need is, we have no right to use up the supplies that we must leave for our children and grandchildren.... That approach was typical of the way Indira Gandhi always thought - she constantly bore in mind the future of her country.

India has surged much further ahead than other countries that have rid themselves of colonial dependence. Of course, India is a huge country, in fact, not just a country, but a whole subcontinent, rich in natural resources and population. But I believe that no less important is another factor: from the very start India chose independence and self-sufficiency - not the shortest road, but the most reliable one. That I regard as the greatest virtue of both Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Obviously for a country just laying the foundation of its economy it is easier to buy, say, aircraft than learn to make its own. India decided to make its own and is making them. Today it is pursuing the same policy in the shipbuilding industry. It's true that India has turned to the Soviet Union and other countries for assistance but did its own industrial construction nevertheless. As a result India today has everything that the industrially developed countries have: nuclear, aerospace, electronic and chemical industries.

India's immense natural wealth and immense population are, of course, both an advantage and a problem: it is enough to recall the gloomy predictions about whether she would be able to feed her fast growing population. However, India has achieved a truly fantastic breakthrough in supplying herself with food, and is already accomplishing, entirely on her own, what is described as the "third wave" of the green revolution.

The present Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, once remarked that the most important of all the things his mother had achieved was that she had restored India's dignity and strengthened her belief in herself. That is putting it very aptly.

To my mind, India's consciousness of her historical, spiritual and cultural greatness played a major role in her decision to rely on her own resources.

Both as the heir to the great humanist traditions of India and as a politician ably forecasting the future, Indira Gandhi stood firmly on positions of peace and international cooperation, while bearing in mind the need constantly to strengthen her own country. She regarded as a highly important step the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with our country, guaranteeing India additional confidence in her own strength.

The life of that remarkable woman was cut tragically short. It is likewise a tragic paradox of history that Indira Gandhi was the victim of the forces that had been brought to life by the strengthening and consolidation of India, for which she had done so much! All the different separatists with their consumerist, narrow psychology mixed with religious chauvinism can be compared with rapidly growing branches that suddenly start imagining that the trunk from which they sprouted is in their way. The narrowness of their views and the absence of any prospects are the exact opposite of the breadth and scale of the views held by all-Indian leader Indira Gandhi on peace, the future and life itself.

Indira Gandhi saw and understood the dangers of the trend to shut oneself within one's own walls in today's world, which insistently calls for the joining of forces, and until the last minute of her life hoped to avert this danger.

Even at the cost of her life. ■

Monument to Indira Gandhi in Moscow, erected in the square named after her, and unveiled on July 3 of this year - the day the Festival of India opened in the Soviet Union.

Photo by A. Sizukhin

TAKING UP A POINT

I've never been to London, but thanks to our newspapers what I am most familiar with there is Charing Cross Station, in the vicinity of which the homeless spend the night. Isn't there anything else in the West, apart from the fate of the homeless and unemployed, that is worthy of attention? Our correspondents on international affairs seem in no hurry to change their approach and throw stereotypes overboard.

N. Sergeyev
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Our associate editor ALBERT PIN replies:

Know your neighbour

I agree that stories of the homeless and jobless in the West appear fairly often in our press. Doesn't their fate deserve our attention? Shouldn't we know that almost a million people in Western Europe have no roofs over their heads today, that there are more than three million homeless in the United States, and 250 million worldwide?

The magnitude and acuteness of the problem are, in my view, self-evident. And it is necessary to write about it. Otherwise our picture of the world would be incomplete and inaccurate, just as it would be one-sided and flat if journalists confined themselves solely to recording such problems and facts.

We see that realism, truth and glasnost are increasingly gaining the upper hand when we are describing our own life. As for life in other countries, there is no denying that the changes have been less favourable.

The above letter touches only on descriptions of the realities in one part of the modern world - the capitalist countries. Well, let us leave other subjects aside: foreign policy problems, life in the socialist countries, in the developing countries... Let us discuss how we view the capitalist world.

Let us not oversimplify the picture: at all times, including the years that are now described as years of stagnation, correspondents' reports and stories appeared in our press, and books published which sought to assess the life of other nations without bias, soberly, without self-deception. But together with this trend, there also existed another approach: instead of a picture of a complex, many-faceted, changing life, readers were presented with a static image. Realities were squeezed into a pre-established framework. No profound ideas, no observations were required - it was sufficient to prick and expose that life. This method produced the clichés which, unfortunately, those who saw the world differently also fell back on at times.

Many people probably remember reading in the papers and seeing on TV the mountains of Italian peaches or Greek oranges flattened by bulldozers and then buried.... We found it hard to take in such things: the wonderful fruit of hard work being destroyed because it had proved unneeded, surplus - not to society, but to the traders. Today we learn with bitterness of no less depressing facts in our own country - immense losses in agriculture as a result of inefficiency, irresponsibility, bureaucratism.... These examples are not, of course, of the same order, but they have the same result - the destruction of the fruits of human labour. In the past, unfortunately, it was considered "not the done thing" to speak out openly about our own misfortunes. And little attempt was made to set things right.

The realism with which our domestic affairs are now reported should certainly determine our attitude to the outside world. It should provide not only concrete information, but a full picture as well. What is important is not just separate, even indisputable facts, but their relationship with other phenomena. Without that there can be no objective knowledge, no real assessment of the realities.

Much is learnt from comparisons. But we usually avoided comparisons when they were not in our favour. And readers remained ignorant about such things as, say, the place held by our country in the standard of living. Now economists' figures are cited, and this naturally helps to picture the distance we still have to cover. And it's quite a distance: in per capita national income, the Soviet Union comes the 20th-21st after the leading capitalist countries and the European socialist countries; our consumption of goods and use of services per capita stands at about 40 per cent of the United States level.

It has long been known that many enterprises in the West have accumulated a wealth of experience in the organization of labour. Lenin himself urged us to learn from the capitalists. Despite our truly brilliant scientific and technical achievements, it is no secret that in some fields our technology lags behind. Are all specialists fully aware of this? Why shouldn't the mass media take a more active stand on this matter? Anything that we could adapt for our own use or learn from should not remain outside the sphere of our attention. As yet, however, people here are, for example, better informed about the high cost of hospital care and surgery in the United States than about the overall level of medicine there. And what about the countless articles in our press on Western advertizing and its victims, written for the most part in a sarcastic vein, while there are infinitely fewer competent items about the service industry, which not so long ago was regarded by us as an almost parasitical industry, a symptom of the decay of capitalism. "Green Europe" does indeed have many acute problems, and their analysis could be of interest not only to specialists. But other subjects, I am sure, would also arouse interest. For instance, a report on how the family of a French, British or Canadian farmer manages to bring in consistently high harvests from 150-200 hectares of arable land. Such a report could be useful to our agricultural workers, who are beginning to work on the family team principle.

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

Flight SU-245 Thursday	Airport	Flight SU-246 Thursday
dep. 07.40	Moscow	arr. 18.20
arr. 09.00	Leningrad	
dep. 10.00		dep. 11.30
arr. 10.30	Dublin	
Thursday	Airport	Thursday

Schedule local time

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Depth, moulded, m	15.00
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Deadweight, t	28,500
Engine, kw	8,750

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АЭРОФЛОТ
Soviet airlines

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

AEROFLOT
Soviet airlines

For particulars, write to any Aeroflot office in your country.

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What we can do

What with the continuous four-decade-long arms buildup, neither our lives, our belongings, nor even our values seem any safer today than at the end of World War II. For years on end now we've been continuously involved in a rather deadly game of missile catchup, and living all this time under the illusion that our nuclear power progress provides us with more and more peace and protection. Neither SDI, nor any other kind of nuclear proliferation will provide either of us with the shield to make us live or sleep better. Instead of better, in point of fact, our living standards have retrogressed, for guns have absolutely no nutritional value.

The determined efforts of Gorbachev and of Reagan merit praise and center stage applause. But applause for statesmen is not enough - they are not actors on a stage. Care must be taken not to shoot down the warming of Soviet-American relations, as sadly happened with the Powers U-2 flight.

Credit in some part for the improvement of relations should be shared as well by other levels of government and by citizens as well. The Chautauqua-Jurmala conferences, and the student, cultural, and people-to-people interchange, all make a contribution. When government is weighed down by national security responsibilities which dare not be delegated, it behoves us common folk to help to promote the kind of diplomacy that can be best explored via non-governmental means.

Informal citizen diplomacy, non-official personal diplomacy have been around for a long time. Whether consciously or not, travellers to foreign lands have always been citizen ambassadors. Boisterous, superior attitudes, my-language-only kinds of behaviour have, since times immemorial, painted negative images of their country. But there are other examples as well. The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, various public organizations are helping to promote positive pictures, planting seeds of good will, promoting peace at the level of people-to-people contacts. With awareness of the need to make our contribution to stable peace and considering the rights of others, we can, all of us, address and resolve the concerns and problems of both people and government.

The interchange of scientific knowledge for the betterment of the human condition, the exchange of art, music, and education, the partnership of nations in combating disaster, disease, and hunger will all reflect back in a positive way on us both. The at-times understandable distrust of each other may, as we move ahead, give us pause for caution, but ultimately can be forgotten. The goal misperceptions of the other must be countered by positive experiences. It is only from a variety of rich, fertilizer-nutrients of working and living together as co-partners, can trust and peaceful relations between the super-powers become firmly and strongly rooted.

GEORGE NEWMAN,
New York, U.S.A.

A READER'S CONTRIBUTION

This photograph was taken by Wolfgang Miksch, a reader in the German Democratic Republic. The dove has always been a symbol of peace, the most precious thing for us. May people the world over preserve peace as carefully as this boy treats a dove!

A war that never started

SERGO MIKOYAN, D.Sc. (Hist.)

Twenty-five years later, Sunday, October 28, 1962, can probably be looked back on as the Sunday when the world almost ended. At least the members of ExCom - John Kennedy's most exclusive group of advisers - still call the previous day "Black Saturday," the day when peace hung in the balance. On learning that the President's brother Robert Kennedy had told the Soviet ambassador, "if you don't remove those bases (from Cuban territory - S.M.), we will remove them," his ExCom colleague George Ball sent his family as far away as possible from Washington. Many people in the United States had begun leaving big cities even before that - right after John Kennedy announced the naval blockade of Cuba on October 22. The blockade marked the beginning of the crisis.

Views differ as to what that international crisis should be called - the Caribbean or the missile crisis? A crisis that only ended on November 20, 1962.

What was it all about? Why had the Soviet Union deployed its medium-range missiles in Cuba in the autumn of 1962? If they were transported there to prevent American aggression against the island in the Caribbean, then our name for it - the Caribbean crisis - is more correct. If it was a question of establishing missile parity (bearing in mind the U.S. nuclear bases encircling our country), then it would be equally right to call it the missile crisis.

The real threat of invasion

The author of this article witnessed some of the important stages in the settlement of the crisis, and before that had closely followed events, and did not doubt that the United States intended to use force against the Cuban revolution. One such attempt had been made slightly earlier - in April 1961 mercenary CIA bands had invaded Cuba, but were routed at Playa Giron - the Bay of Pigs - just three days later. It was then that the hawks began to consider a massed attack on the island, using the U.S. military machine.

One can be certain that somewhere in the Pentagon's safes a detailed plan, or perhaps several, for such an invasion is being kept in the utmost secrecy. Unfortunately, no time limit exists on keeping such sensational documents classified. However, the Senate hearings on the CIA in the 1960s provide sufficient material about the extremes the U.S. government could have gone to. The numerous plans to assassinate Fidel Castro did not envisage his replacement by Ché Guevara.

At the January 1962 conference of foreign ministers of the Organization of American States in Punta del Este (Uruguay), American Secretary of State Dean Rusk made no little effort to achieve the isolation of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, and get numerous sanctions against the republic passed. That was the diplomatic preparation for aggression. Propaganda preparations had started much earlier. Overall, everything followed an easily discernible pattern. The invasion of Grenada in 1983 shows the mechanism of this process, as well as its finale if everything proceeds according to the scenario.

Some American political analysts seem to have a surprisingly bad memory, pretending that the United States never had any serious intention of "wiping out Castro and his regime." They maintain that the Soviet missiles appeared in Cuba for the sole purpose of threatening the United States, exclusively to achieve parity of forces, which was something Washington could never allow. But let us set out to prove the contrary: the crisis was resolved, the missiles were withdrawn and, thanks to the exchange of telegrams between Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy, Washington gave assurances that there would be no armed aggression against Cuba.

Of course, it should be acknowledged that the idea of achieving parity at a time when a nuclear deterrent existed also had no small part to play. We could recall that, according to figures given by Robert McNamara, at that time the United States had 5,000 nuclear warheads compared with our country's mere 300 (a ratio of about 17:1). Nor was there parity in the means of delivery. We were virtually surrounded by U.S. missile bases. So what was unnatural about trying to make the nuclear deterrent more of a **real deterrent!** Not for nothing do many believe that the Soviet Union started building genuine parity in nuclear forces after the Caribbean (or missile) crisis and because of that crisis.

The Soviet Union was represented at the funeral of John Kennedy in November 1963 by Anastas Mikoyan. When he met the new President Lyndon Johnson, the latter twice confirmed that the United States had abided and would continue to abide by the agreement reached in October-November 1962.

Those were fine words. But if one is to believe American journalist Tad Szulc, at the end of 1964 and in 1965 the CIA, with the approval of the said President Johnson, drew up a plan which envisaged

Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy.

the assassination of Fidel Castro to be followed immediately by the invasion of Cuba by mercenaries, but, apparently, with much greater backing from U.S. armed forces. That plan wasn't implemented because a much more urgent affair came up - the invasion of the Dominican Republic in April 1965. In addition, Washington's hands were increasingly tied by the dirty war in Vietnam.

To be or not to be! To be!

In the 1970s the Soviet-American accord as a result of which the Caribbean crisis was resolved had to be reaffirmed on more than one occasion, in connection, for example, with Soviet submarines that had to call at Cuba's ports for technical reasons. Washington did not regard this as a violation of the accord.

And then suddenly on September 14, 1983, President Reagan observed that the accord no longer held. Shortly afterwards his friend, former governor of Texas William Clements, who sat on the two-party Kissinger Commission on Central America, introduced his own personal contribution to the commission's report: there had never been any such accord! In February 1984, he elaborated on this point when speaking in Dallas (this is described in the recent book "The Closest Enemies" by Wayne Smith, who was present on that occasion). Clements added that the accord had been violated, as no U.N. inspection of the removal of the missiles had been carried out. Here Clements contradicts himself - how can it be possible to violate something that had never, according to him, existed?

On this concrete issue, I can provide the following evidence: the method chosen to verify the dismantling (from the air by U-2 planes) and the withdrawal of the missiles by Soviet transporters (visual observation from American naval vessels close to the Soviet ships) had been agreed on with U Thant, the then acting U.N. Secretary-General, as well as with John McCloy and Adlai Stevenson. They had been authorized by President John Kennedy to accept this arrangement when conducting their talks with Anastas Mikoyan, as is set out in the protocols. The latter, in turn, had long and detailed discussions on this and other subjects with Fidel Castro! And the Cuban leader entered into direct contact with U Thant, who flew to Havana at the end of October 1962. All that remains to be noted is that the suggestion for this kind of verification was proposed by McCloy - that is by the American side!

The U.S. administration cannot fail to be aware of this. Consequently, it was an attempt to undermine one of the most important postwar agreements. Why most important? Because it helped civilization to survive in the hour of its greatest danger.

In mid-October 1987 it fell to my lot to take part in the conference on the 25th anniversary of the Caribbean crisis. It was held at the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University (U.S.A.).

Anastas Mikoyan and Fidel Castro.

Behind closed doors, members of the above-mentioned ExCom, Robert McNamara (former U.S. Defence Secretary), McGeorge Bundy (President John Kennedy's former national security adviser) and Theodore Sorensen (former special counsel to John Kennedy), along with American political science professors, and three Soviet participants, discussed and recalled those distant days. We recalled Robert Kennedy's book, "Thirteen Days," in which he wrote how, as of October 16, when all discussions of the issue were conducted in Washington in conditions of the utmost secrecy, many had suggested that bombs should be dropped immediately on the Soviet missiles, and at the same time on all Cuban military targets, with a simultaneous massed invasion of the island. All possible consequences were considered, taking into account, naturally, that our missiles were understandably guarded by a contingent of Soviet forces.

At Harvard we paid tribute to John Kennedy, who at that time had rejected such proposals, as they clearly led to war with the Soviet Union. Kennedy preferred a political, rather than a military way out of the crisis that had flared up so suddenly following the United States' sharp reaction to measures to strengthen Cuba's safety. (To back up the military option, 200,000 troops were dispatched to bases in Florida in addition to the Navy and Air Force reserves already mobilized.)

Kennedy was probably able to visualize how Khrushchev, with whom he was exchanging letters, the entire Soviet leadership and Soviet people would have reacted to the destruction of Soviet medium-range missiles, to the deaths of many of our servicemen, and an attack on Cuba.

The lessons of the crisis

Why are we looking back today so intently on the events of a quarter of a century ago? Because, I repeat, it was the most dangerous moment in international relations in the postwar years. The Caribbean missile crisis taught us a great deal. It convinced us, for instance, that the political headquarters of the two mightiest powers in the world could, it turned out, lack any clearcut picture of each other's aims and intentions. To this day it is still debated in the U.S. as to why Soviet missiles were installed in Cuba. Different theories are put forward. Yet the U.S. reaction depended on the answer to that "why?" And Khrushchev, as is now clear to us with hindsight, did not foresee how Kennedy would react if the missiles were detected before he was officially informed of their deployment.

John Kennedy cooled the passions of ExCom. The President had the common sense to say: "It isn't the first step that concerns me, but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth step - and we don't go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so."

To show how close we stood to the point of no return, I might add that initially the U.S. naval command interpreted Washington's blockade of Cuba as giving it the right to sink Soviet merchant vessels if their captains refused to answer questions about their cargoes. It was only the explicit and categoric elucidation given by Defence Secretary McNamara that halted the seemingly inevitable beginning of military action on the approaches to the Caribbean. Remember, our submarines were in the Atlantic.... The CIA did not stop its anti-Cuban operation Mongoose launched earlier.

It is worth recalling the carelessness of certain Soviet commanders with regard to camouflage. In general, how could the missiles be deployed in secret, and was it really necessary to do so?

In other words, the actions of both the top political leaders and the military command at various levels seemed bent on substantiating the principle named after its author, the McNamara law: "It is impossible to predict with a high degree of confidence what the effects of the use of military force will be, because of the risks of accident, miscalculation, misperception and inadvertence."

So why has the 25th anniversary of the Caribbean crisis received so much attention the world over? For the simple reason that today, as never before, it is important to learn the positive lessons from our common past. These lessons teach us how to emerge from the most acute, most dangerous crisis, how much patience, caution, calmness and wisdom are needed to make sure that the crisis does not develop into a catastrophe. But the main lesson, nevertheless, is not to allow events to take us to the brink of the abyss. Not for nothing was it then that the "hot line," or as they are also called, red telephones, were installed in the Kremlin and the White House.

As a witness to many of the events of the crisis (I accompanied Anastas Mikoyan as his secretary on the trip to New York and then to Cuba), I should like to make one further point. When considering the problem that faced them, Kennedy's ExCom completely forgot one participant in the events... Cuba. The President's closest advisers failed to consider that the missiles had been installed first and foremost to prevent a seemingly inevitable invasion of the island by U.S. armed forces. Only faced with the acutest of crises did the U.S. government prefer to give Cuba a no-invasion pledge.

It's true that at Harvard Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Theodore Sorensen sincerely and most convincingly assured me that the Kennedy administration had not been planning a direct attack at the time. But Johnson's and subsequently Reagan's inclinations, mentioned earlier, do not rule out the possibility that at some moment the CIA, the Pentagon, the "theoreticians" (who gathered in Santa Fé and compiled the document of the same name underlying Reagan's Latin American policy), might have imposed their own adventurist plans on the administration.

An important point is that the crisis in itself could not, in effect, have been resolved without the participation of Cuba. It is true that the quick pace of events in the first days of the crisis made it impossible to arrange tripartite talks, but Fidel Castro was kept fully informed from Moscow of their course, and was consulted both on issues of principle and on details. Nevertheless, Anastas Mikoyan's mission (which began on November 1) was necessary. As a result of it certain aspects of the tripartite accord - the U.S.-the U.S.S.R.-Cuba - had to be amended. And Washington agreed to those changes.

Back in the 1940s Albert Einstein said: "The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift towards unparalleled catastrophe." The world almost slipped into the abyss of such a catastrophe before the political leaders understood the full significance of the words of that great scientist. In October-November 1962 political leaders displayed the first elements of the approach which has been put forward by our party leadership as the only alternative to a nuclear holocaust, and known as new global political thinking. It was thanks to that accord that in subsequent years the actions of the two sides in many crisis situations were more cautious than they might have been had it not been for the memory of the day when the brother of the American President wondered if it would be the last Saturday of his life....

What are the most important problems facing the Mongolian economy today?

When in the 1920s we started building a new society our economic potential was small, so our task was to increase it as rapidly as possible. Our pace today, regrettably, has up to now been lower than the average for the CMEA countries. That is, probably, our biggest problem, as the rate of population increase in Mongolia is comparatively high (Mongolia is one of the 30 countries in the world with large increases).

On the one hand, the growth of the population constitutes a favourable factor for economic development, but at the same time one cannot shut one's eyes to the difficulties it creates. It calls for an advanced social infra-structure, for the creation of more jobs, which in itself requires substantial investments. And if to all that we add that in the past 25 years the average annual increase in our per capita national income was lower than in any of the other CMEA countries, the extent of the efforts required becomes obvious. Success depends, first and foremost, on the degree of industrialization. Mongolia is now completing the formation of its vital industries which will supply it with energy, the services, consumer goods, as well as export goods.

Industry in Mongolia already accounts for more than a third of the national income. But its inter-sectoral and territorial structures are insufficiently developed. The production and technical ties between industry and agriculture are reduced by and large to supplying the processing industry with agricultural raw materials. The industrial foundation of the national economy is being built chiefly through acquiring plant abroad. Industry is concentrated largely in the central economic region of the country. And, finally, we have still to identify the industry that will play the key role in our scientific and technical progress - and that is not simple matter. In the sparsely populated regions of Mongolia (and there are a number of such regions) nomadic cattle breeding remains the predominant way of life. But it is there that it is necessary to provide homes with electricity, mechanize labour, and build small but efficient enterprises to process livestock produce.

Such are Mongolia's specific features today. That means we have to learn how to produce the type of machine we need. Such machines are not produced in other countries.

You referred to agriculture and mentioned nomadic cattle breeding as its basis. How do you propose to develop it: on the basis of large animal husbandry collectives or on the basis of individual farm-type units?

New vistas of economic progress

The Director of the Institute of Economics of the State Planning Committee and the Academy of Sciences of the Mongolian People's Republic, PUNTSAGDORGIYN LUVSANDORZH, answers questions put by New Times economic observer Vladimir Kvint.

Today's rate of increase of stockfarm output, and, consequently, of all agricultural output, is very low. And that at a time when the population is growing rapidly, especially the urban population, and when there is a growing demand for farm produce. Moreover, the productivity of privately owned stock is higher than on state farms, as they are better looked after. For instance, the number of lambs from privately owned ewes is higher than the average for the country - 6 more per hundred ewes. If farm cooperatives and state farms were to succeed in achieving such rates, we could increase our herds by almost a million head a year, and we could increase our meat output, designed both for home consumption and export, by 40 per cent. So what we need is an economic mechanism that provides greater incentives for each agricultural worker to advance publicly-owned stockbreeding. In principle, this should be through team or family units. We have already begun to introduce this form as an experiment. It operates at all mechanized dairy farms, and we are now preparing to introduce it in the stock-breeding sections of agricultural associations. We want to see these teams operating on a democratic basis, as socialist farms. Members of a team can replace a team leader they themselves initially elected, and the income must be divided strictly in accordance with each member's work contribution. As for the overall technology, we believe that stable-pasture stockbreeding is best suited to our needs, especially for the highly-productive breeds brought in from other countries, while sheep of local Mongolian breeds should be switched to the distant pasture system.

Sheep grazing on the steppe. The control room of a dairy in Ulan Bator.
TASS photos



It is known that certain adverse features which developed in recent years in the management of the Mongolian economy have affected the solution of social problems....

...Not only have affected, but still do affect. Sober analysis has revealed mistakes and shortcomings in our social development. We have to admit honestly that in planning social measures we often followed the principle of allocating leftovers, i.e., we simply made allocations for social needs the last item. We still have not learned to solve social problems in conjunction with economic problems.

The measures now being taken to improve the management of the national economy are designed to put this right. This applies first and foremost to giving production collectives greater rights. They will retain a certain proportion of their profits for use as they see fit - what proportion will be determined for a whole five-year period and it will be a fixed one. As I have already said, we are introducing team contracts and internal cost accounting.... We are doing everything we can to bring into play all our reserves in order to resolve social problems. The state will help people who wish to build their own homes with loans and in acquiring building materials.

What part does Mongolia play in the socialist international division of labour?

Mongolia's share in the mutual trade of the CMEA countries is comparatively small. However, our republic does produce many kinds of export goods. We supply the fraternal countries with non-ferrous metal concentrates, as well as products of our light and food industries.

In turn, Mongolia buys from its partners equipment and transport facilities, farm machinery, petroleum products, and chemical products. Major processing plants have been built and are under construction in Mongolia with the technical and economic assistance of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries. And that is now determining the new strategic direction of the Mongolian economy - the development of the processing industry. ■

FRANCE'S SCAPEGOATS

What is racism in modern France? What is the essence of the immigration problem? Is it true that all the problems besetting the French are created by foreign workers? We interviewed Guy Poussy, an immigration expert and member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, member of the General Council of the Department Val-de-Marne, and member of the Council of the Ile-de-France.

When did France begin to attract foreign labour?

The employment of foreign workers has been a specific feature of France's industrial development since about the mid-19th century. The demographic reasons for this phenomenon are to be found in the fact that France remained an agrarian country for a fairly long time, with most of its population empoloyed in agriculture. However, the countryside did not become a source of cheap manpower as was the case in some other countries. Foreign labour had been used in France since the remote past, but for a time this wasn't particularly obvious as the country possessed an enormous colonial empire. Some French people moved to the colonies in search of permanent jobs and settled down there for good, while the reverse process was also at work. In those days there was massive immigration from other European countries - Poland and Italy. By 1932 the number of immigrants in France had soared to over three million as against just over a million in 1911. Today official statistics put the number of immigrants in France at 4.5 million. Such are the dynamics of immigration growth. An estimated 12 million French citizens are of immigrant parentage or grandparentage.

Immediately after the war a specific feature of immigration was that the influx of those seeking jobs in France was strictly controlled by a special organization. Later, employers required "wild" immigration, as we call it, and cheap manpower from poor countries rushed into the country uncontrolled.

Did it really pay to attract immigrant labour?

Immigrants are prepared to work on any terms, and have not been hardened in class battles. It was easy to oppose them to the French working people. Before a native-born Frenchman "gets to" a machine tool, he goes to kindergarten and then to school, which costs money and takes a couple of decades. But if he takes on an immigrant, an employer gets himself a ready worker in his prime without spending a franc. Immigrants are also used in order to economize on plant modernization. In some other countries the emphasis was on more efficient equipment, and in France, on the super-exploitation of immigrant labour. Competitiveness and increased labour productivity were ensured in this way.

Isn't France at an economic disadvantage because of its relatively slow rate of plant modernization?

The immigration policy is probably not the most important factor in our falling behind in modernization. There is another factor that influences entrepreneurial attitudes to the employment of foreign labour: since the end of the 1960s immigrants have been actively involved in the French working people's struggle for their rights.

Does racism have any social roots in France?

Let me make it perfectly clear, to begin with, that racism comes from ignorance. It is unscientific. That skin colour and other external attributes make no difference at all is an established fact. No race is superior to any other race. And now racism in modern France. Since the beginning of the current crisis, unemployment has assumed enormous proportions and people have started vying with each other for jobs. It has turned out to be very convenient to turn Frenchmen against foreign workers who have allegedly stolen their livelihoods.

France has entered a period of socio-economic decline, and it is very convenient to shift the blame for that onto immigrants, in particular. The extremely right-wing National Front and its chairman Jean-Marie Le Pen are discharging just this function by picturing foreign workers as the root of all evil. In a situation where eight million French people live on 50 francs a day, where the poor are evicted from their flats, and where whole neighbourhoods are inhabited by have-nots, this is extremely dangerous. Le Pen says there are three million unemployed in France because three million foreigners have taken their jobs. Fire the aliens, take on French workers, and everything will be just fine! How does it work out in practice? The Peugeot Motor Works in Sochaux recently dismissed 1,600 immigrant workers who left for home shortly afterwards. However, they haven't been replaced by

The government promptly turns out of France the immigrants who are in the employers' black books.

anyone - whether French, Arab or African. And yet the reactionary ideas of the National Front are gaining currency because they play on people's fear of the consequences of the crisis.

The extreme Right and others too, for that matter, accuse immigrants of spreading crime and violence. What do you think about that?

Crime and violence are not a prerogative of any one race or nation. This problem is linked particularly with certain social groups. If you are young but have no job, your family has problems and your father is out of work, if you live in appalling conditions, you are more likely to become a criminal than someone much better off than you are. This is true of Frenchmen and immigrants alike. But the point is that foreign workers' families often have it so hard that a higher percentage of crime among them - just as among Frenchmen who are in the same plight - is not to be wondered at. Besides, it is very easy to instil an automatic reflex (an Arab is a criminal, for instance). Exploiting the "immigrant issue" has the purpose of dividing people. We French ought to have respect for foreign workers if only for the reason that they have contributed to building up our national wealth for decades.

Are workers of different nationalities set against each other?

Oh, yes! Getting the sack is the worst thing that can happen to the workingman today, so he is prepared to go to any lengths to keep his job. Employers take advantage of that and try to sow antagonism between the French and the immigrants. As they dismissed immigrants, they assured the French of job security. And now it's the French workingman's turn. The immigrants were said to be able to do unskilled work only. However, the experiments conducted at the Renault plants, in particular, have proved that, given a chance to learn, immigrants attain high levels of skill and perform any, even the most complicated, operations as well as Frenchmen.

The previous French governments encouraged immigrants to return home. Does this solve the problem?

They were indeed encouraged to return home, and those who left were even paid for it. In 1983-85 many immigrants took up the offer, but over the past years the number of those wishing to leave has dwindled to nought. This is chiefly explained by the fact that many immigrants have become Frenchified, if I may say so, and put down roots in the country. After all, they are human beings, each with his or her own fate. Officially immigration came to an end in 1975. Foreigners working in France were permitted to invite their families. Children were born. The links with the countries of origin weakened, and immigrants went back only on leave, to see their relatives. Many have nowhere to return to any longer. In their native towns and villages in, say, Morocco or Senegal, there are still more jobless than in France. This being so, the immigrants were victims of intimidation. Cases of their houses being set fire to became more frequent. Or take the planned government reform of the citizenship code, which makes it difficult for immigrants to become naturalized here. This will affect mostly the children of those who came here to make a living years ago. These young people were born and bred and are now living in France, which is their native country, but they are treated here as second-rate citizens.

What can you say about the class awareness of immigrant workers? Do they join their French comrades in the struggle for their common interests? Or are employers succeeding in keeping the workers divided on a racial basis?

No. Today immigrants from all countries take active part in our comon class struggle. Having joined the French working-class movement" they have awoken to many realities, are no longer socially passive, and have their French comrades' support. Look how many immigrants are elected trade union leaders and workers' delegates! The bourgeoisie is aware of these changes, which do not suit it.

New immigrants "qualify" for admission to the country if they satisfy certain political criteria. Why is France so willing to accept immigrants from Southeast Asia who prospered in South Vietnam under the Americans? Because these people not only agree to work on any terms, but are anti-Communist into the bargain. It is no accident that they are so promptly allowed to settle down and work in France and that the bosses like them for entertaining no undesirable political sentiments! Illegal immigration is another side of the process. It is economically profitable to use someone with a precarious existence in France or, better still, without any rights or documents.

Let us go back to the problem of racism, if you don't mind. A look through the newspapers will show that manifestations of racial intolerance abound in France. However, I have the impression that there is another tendency as well. During the student demonstrations last winter I saw European, Arab and African youths and girls marching together. It looks as if for the young the problem of origin does not greatly matter.

Indeed, our young people are free of racial prejudice, on the whole. The dialectics are as follows: as the number of racist outrages grows, intolerance of racism becomes increasingly pronounced, and more and more people come to denounce racism as an ideology.

And now, the last question. We say "racism," "discrimination," "inequality." Any evidence of that?

Firstly. Police are entitled to check the papers of anyone they think suspicious. Most of the "suspects" are dark-skinned young people. If anything goes wrong, they are shot at. There have been many cases of that....

Secondly. What happens when applicants are considered for jobs? Theoretically, all the diplomas are of equal value. But when choosing between a European and a non-European, the former stands a better chance of getting a job, even if the latter is better trained and has French citizenship.

Thirdly, the housing problem. We now have whole cities controlled by the Right which are actually closed to immigrants. Quite frequently even well-to-do immigrants are refused the lease of an apartment. Foreign workers are forced from city centres to the suburbs, which are turning into virtual ghettos. Incidentally, these ghettos are breeding grounds for crime due to the social conditions obtaining there.

Fourth. There are in France special courts that look into industrial conflicts, with employers and workers represented in them. Immigrant workers cannot be elected to these courts. So an employer is free to exploit an immigrant with impunity.

Fifth. The FCP has long been working to secure for immigrants the right to take part in municipal elections. Taxes are levied on them all right, but they have no say in adopting decisions which directly affect them.

Sixth. There is a social security fund from which family allowances are paid. Foreign workers contribute to it as much as the French do, but often get smaller allowances. Or take the Medical Insurance Fund. At an estimate by the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (an elite higher educational institution that trains executives for the state machinery and the leading companies - **N.Y.**), immigrants contributed 13.7 billion francs to it while getting only 11.2 billion in insurance premiums in 1982.

So who lives at whose expense? Immigrants at the French people's, as Le Pen claims, or vice versa? The situation is much the same as far as the pension fund is concerned. In order to receive pensions in their old age, the French contribute a proportion of their earnings to the pension fund throughout their working lives. The same Ecole Nationale d'Administration established that in 1982 immigrants had paid 8.4 billion francs into the fund as against a mere 5.3 billion received in pensions. What's more, the government maintains a social action fund to support immigrants. The fund gets nothing from the state budget and collections for it are raised by the immigrants themselves, which means that they have only themselves to rely on. Have I answered your question?

Interviewer: NIKITA YERMAKOV
Paris

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WARWICK GREENE'S SPECIAL MISSION

LEV BEZYMENSKY

Liepaja is an old city. It was first mentioned by chroniclers in 1253. Its convenient location on the shores of the Baltic Sea and its excellent harbour made Liepaja an important transport and, subsequently, industrial centre. The ruins of a fort are a mute reminder of the old Russian naval base from where Admiral Rozhestvensky's squadron set out on the long voyage to the Pacific which ended in the Battle of Tsushima. In the local museum you also find evidence of the city's close ties with the history of the Russian revolution. For one thing, house No.7 on Liela (now Lenin) Street was once a transit centre through which Lenin's newspaper Iskra was shipped to Russia.

Among other exhibits in the museum are orders dated 1915 issued by the German occupation forces and photos of British troops in Liepaja port in 1918. Yes, Liepaja witnessed that too. The documents on display testify that on December 1, 1918, a British squadron, commanded by Admiral Sinclair, dropped anchor in the Liepaja roads. It was followed by French warships. And in April 1919 a ship flying the Stars and Stripes appeared in the outer roads. From it landed American officers members of a military mission sent by President Wilson and headed by Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene.

Why such a concentration of naval strength in this old city on the shores of the Baltic Sea? That is the subject of the present study, which is based on U.S.S.R. and G.D.R. archive documents, researches by historians as well as press reports. The Warwick Greene mission will be central to this survey which might well be subtitled: **the unprecedented and instructive story of the interference by the United States and other Western countries in the revolution in Latvia. And not only Latvia.**

On the Western flank

It was the year 1919. Latvia is a Soviet republic proclaimed by the Ist congress of Soviets of workers', landless peasants' and rifles' deputies of united Latvia, held January 13-15, 1919, in Riga. The entire territory of the republic had been liberated with the exception of a small "triangle" in the Liepaja area. The Latvian Red Rifles were engaged in heavy fighting here and on other sectors of the front. Their strength was taxed to the utmost. Besides the battlefronts, there was the urgent need to begin tackling the incredibly difficult task of buidling socialism in a country devastated by years of German occupation and almost incessant hostilities.

The head of the government of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Latvia was the well-known Latvian revolutionary Peteris Stucka. The seat of the government was the old building in the centre of Riga long known as the Knights' Palace. The memorial plaque on the front of the building reminds us of this. The building itself now houses the Supreme Soviet of Latvia. It was here that I talked with the Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Aleksandrs Drizulis, an eminent historian.

"How did it come about that in Latvia, where the working class movement had traditionally been so storng, the course of the revolution was far from smooth?", I asked him.

"The interweaving of the social and national struggle here on the western periphery of the former Russian empire was exceptionally complex. But one thing is quite clear: the course of the revolution - and Soviet power in Latvia was first proclaimed as far back as 1917 - might have been different were it not for the special, peripheral location of the Baltic area. Here international imperialism, panic-stricken by the victory of the October Revolution, had an opportunity to intervene directly. Moreover, with armed force.

"As a matter of fact, that intervention began before the October Revolution, when General Kornilov surrendered Riga to the Kaiser's forces in August 1917. The second wave of the German invasion swept over Latvia in February 1918 when it was completely overrun by the invaders who drowned the Soviet power in blood. True, the November revolution of 1918 in Germany changed the situation. It seemed then that the foreign invasion was at an end."

"But it was not..."

"Indeed not. Today few are aware of the significance of Article 12 of the Armistice between the Entente and Germany signed on November 11, 1918, at Compiègne. But at the time, that article was one of the main instruments of struggle against Soviet Russia and other Soviet republics."

"What exactly did it say?"

"It said that German troops located outside the boundaries of Germany were to be withdrawn and demobilized only when the Entente considered this necessary. In particular, German troops in the Baltic were not to be withdrawn."

Incredibly difficult

Paradoxes are a feature of history. But what happened after the defeat of Germany in the first world war was not just a paradox, it was a crime. Instead of stamping out a seat of aggression, the Entente entered into a compact with the German military with the object of putting an end to Soviet power through their agency. A secret agreement was appended to Article 12 of the Compiègne Armistice under which Germany was to keep its troops in the east to fight Bolshevism.

President Wilson is sometimes depicted as an opponent of armed intervention. But his own words give the lie to this contention. He said that the only way to counteract Bolshevism was to extirpate its roots. But this was incredibly difficult to do, he added. He, as well as the leaders of Britain and France racked their brains to find some way of achieving their purpose. Could the necessary military means perhaps be found in the Baltic area? On March 5, 1919, the German Armistice

Commission made this proposal: if the Entente wants the German troops to fight the Bolsheviks, it has only to say the word.

The German 8th Army was stationed in the Baltic area at that time. There was unrest in its ranks, Soldiers' committees had begun to be set up; they demanded to be sent home immediately, and displayed solidarity with the revolutionary people. For this reason the military authorities pinned their hopes on mercenaries, on the notorious Iron Division. The hirelings were promised money and land in Latvia. Another source of cannon fodder for German imperialism was the "baronial volunteer force" recruited from among the Baltic Germans and known as the Baltic Landeswehr. Liepaja was the centre of the German military presence. Here at No. 3, Liela Street, were the headquarters of the 6th Reserve Army Corps commanded by General Ruediger von der Goltz, whose service record included the suppression of the revolution in Finland.

The British, French and U.S. leaders knew of course that Goltz and the German government aimed at more than the "crushing of the Bolsheviks." The allies had long been aware of the plans for the restoration of the Duchy of Kurland as part of Germany. They knew too about the recent petition submitted by the Baltic barons seeking the establishment of a "Baltic state" in personal union with a Prussian king. In these circumstances was it wise to rely on the Germans?

There were proposals from other sources as well.In November 1918, a provisional bourgeois government headed by the Peasant Union leader Karlis Ulmanis, was hastily set up in occupied Riga. Strictly speaking, this initiative did not come from the Entente. Goltz himself confirmed in early 1919 that the Ulmanis government "was formed two months ago by the German authorities."

However, knowing the actual alignment of forces, the bourgeois leaders deferred to the British. On November 23, 1918, Siegfried Meierovics, the future Latvian Foreign Minister, assured the British Foreign Office that Ulmanis was "a strong supporter of the allies" and promised to form a "union of Latvia and Estonia for the protection of their fronts from Bolshevism."

Meanwhile the supreme council of the Entente powers, meeting in Paris, awaited recommendations from Liepaja - from the British mission headed by Major Keenan and from the French mission. And also from Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene who had been instructed to keep the U.S. government informed.

An American in Liepaja

Greene arrived here on April 7. On April 12 he sent his first report to Paris, stating that an

"important section of the country, including Riga, is held by the Bolsheviks."

His characterization of Ulmanis was annihilating:

"The present de facto government of Latvia is extremely weak, and represents no mandate from the people of Latvia. It would be overthrown immediately if there were popular election. It is a self-constituted government by party leaders...."

Of the Germans he wrote:

"The Germans dominate the situation as they are here in force and the Lettish army is insignificant as a military factor.... This naturally creates a most difficult and anomalous situation, as Lettish people historically are anti-German..."

This was a realistic appraisal. But realism was one thing and objectives were another. Greene formulated the latter quite frankly when he said that the Baltic countries were

"buffer states between Russia and Germany, the military and commercial key to the hinterland of Russia."

These states, he went on to observe, were

"strategic ground: to check the westward flow of Bolshevism and to inaugurate an active and aggressive campaign for the defeat of Bolshevism and the reconstruction of Russia."

Greene, of course, was not original in this: his British and French colleagues had anticipated him. However, if London and Paris were suspicious of Goltz's intentions, Greene did not share such doubts. In a report dated April 15, 1919 he recommended that all restrictions against supplying the German troops in Kurland be removed.

On April 16 he again insisted that the German troops be supplied with everything they needed. This was extremely important, he stressed; without the Germans, the country would be immediately overrun by the Bolsheviks.

German troops in Riga (1918).

Red Rifles entering the capital. January 3, 1919.

As regards the Germans' plans, Greene said:

"Germany should have a share, but not a monopoly. Her forces should not be precipitately withdrawn."

Recommendations of this kind suited the German invaders. The plan (as can be seen from a Landeswehr supreme headquarters document dated May 10, 1919) was to take possession of Riga, set up a Baltic state formally independent of Germany, and organize an army to invade Soviet Russia. All this was to be done not against the wishes of the Entente but with its assistance. The capture of Riga, the document said, was necessary

"since only in this way is it possible to win the confidence of the Entente and become a new decisive factor."

In the campaign against Russia? But it was decided to attend to some political matters first. The Ulmanis government no longer suited the Germans as it vacillated between reliance on the Germans and on the British. A Landeswehr strike force under Baron Manteuffel and a detachment of the regular army under Pfeffer (future obergruppenfuehrer SA) replaced the Ulmanis cabinet with a Germanophile, pastor Andrejs Niedra.

The British mission was naturally indignant. It gave sanctuary to Ulmanis and tried to limit the appetites of the Baltic barons. At this point Lieutenant Colonel Greene intervened. On May 1, 1919, he wrote a letter to Niedra in which, referring to a conversation he had had that morning with the pastor, who had offered to mediate between the Latvians and the Baltic Germans, he made a point of declaring that America had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Latvia.

Fine words! But Greene was not above going back on his own words. For further he wrote that the main concern at the moment was to form a provisional government de facto which would sincerely support all anti-Bolshevik elements and which would be sufficiently stable.

And although Greene knew quite well how bitterly the Latvian people hated the mercenaries he, as distinct from the British, supported the change of premier. Niedra was a placeman of the Baltic Landeswehr commander Fletcher, for whom he had previously acted as a spy penetrating the positions of the Soviet forces in the guise of beggar.

Difficult spring

The spring of 1919 was a difficult one for both Soviet Latvia and the Russian Federation. At the end of March the Latvian Red Rifles succeeded with great difficulty in checking the offensive of the numerically strong and well-equipped forces of Goltz and Fletcher. The March offensive of the Germans coincided with that of Kolchak in Siberia. With the support of the British fleet, Soviet power in Estonia was overthrown. In May Yudenich began his march on Petrograd. It was at this juncture that the supreme council of the Entente powers approved - on May 9 - a plan for the advance of Goltz's forces in Latvia.

American politicians once again emerged as zealous advocates of the use of German mercenaries against the Baltic peoples. Among these politicians was the future U.S. President Herbert Hoover, who in those years occupied a key post as head of the American Relief Administration (ARA).

In his memoirs Hoover writes that he followed developments in the Baltic countries very closely. He mentions Ulmanis (recalling that he had studied in the United States). Recorded, too, are the events in Liepaja - Hoover was clearly displeased at the plans "for the establishment of the domination of the Baltic Germans." But his anti-Soviet antipathies outweighed his anti-German sentiments. On May 7, 1919, Hoover sent the supreme council of the Entente a memorandum about the situation in Latvia which amounted to undisguised incitement to take action. Stooping to downright misrepresentation of the facts, he alleged that "Red terror" was rampant in Riga. He also professed concern about the hunger in that city, although he himself had ordered that no food supplies be sent there. Without waiting for Washington's reaction, Hoover decided to act on his own. His report said:

"I sent a telegram to general von der Goltz (whose duty under the armistice was to preserve order in that region) asking him to occupy Riga."

But Hoover was a long way from Riga and Greene was nearby. On April 11, 1919, the Lieutenant Colonel left for the front to meet with Iron Division commander Major Bischoff, a man whom General Goltz had described as being a "born Landsknecht." Bischoff, incidentally, was well aware of the special role being played by the U.S.A. He was later to write in his memoirs that the Americans

"were the only representatives of the Entente who after the war psychosis had been overcome were able to appraise things objectively and tried to facilitate German success."

No wonder Greene and Bischoff soon found a common language. To quote Bischoff again:

"The very day the strike force toppled the Ulmanis government in Libau (the old name of Liepaja - L.B.) an American mission led by Greene and Dawley arrived in Mitau (Jelgava). Its arrival was announced by corps headquarters.... I replied frankly to all the mission's questions, besides which I tried to make it clear to them that two thirds of the Latvian population entertained Bolshevist sentiments."

As we know, Greene himself had no illusions about the sentiments of the Latvian people. Bischoff's appraisal of the situation coincided with Greene's:

"After the report by a staff officer about the numerical strength and combat capability of our units and the enemy's, the Americans, evidently on instructions from other Entente missions, asked whether we were capable of capturing Riga. I replied briefly: 'Yes.'"

There followed a dialogue between Bischoff and Greene worthy of the pen of a humourist and not a documentalist:



General von der Goltz.

"Why haven't you done it then?"

"Because politically that would have been a great mistake!"

"But it would be the humane thing to do!"

Even the anti-Communist Bischoff was taken aback by the hypocrisy of his high-ranking visitor. But despite his indignation, Bischoff agreed to carry out the order. As regards the humane aspect of the matter, we shall return to that later.

What they fought for

"I was 19 when I joined the Red Rifles," Janis Draudins said. "I had just finished school. At that time it was clear to all of us that the Soviet power had to be defended. At the beginning of 1919 I volunteered and was sent to the 1st Ust-Dvinsk Regiment. We new recruits were trained in Riga, after which we were sent to the front. In spring we took up defensive positions in the Kalnciems area."

The term "Latvian Red Rifles" is more than a designation of an army unit. It stands for a remarkable phenomenon, unparalleled in the history of the revolution. The men of the Latvian regiments set a shining example of proletarian internationalism, fighting as they did not only for



Anlage 1.

Uebersetzung.

Amerikanische Kommission
für Friedens-Verhandlungen
Gesandschaft für Finnland, Estonia, Latvija und Litthauen.

Libau, Latwija
1.Mai 1919.

Herrn Andreas Niedra,
Libau, Latvija.

Teurer Herr Niedra!

Mit Bezugnahme auf unsere Rücksprache von heute Morgen, wo Sie als Vermittler zwischen Letten und Balten fungierten, wünsche ich folgende Punkte festzulegen:

"Dear Mr Niedra."
From the archives of the American military mission.



Major Bischoff.

the freedom of Latvia but on all the battlefronts of the civil war.

The majority of the working people of Latvia, like Janis Draudins, were wholeheartedly on the side of the Bolsheviks.

The very first moves of the government headed by Peteris Stucka were aimed at ending minority rule by the bourgeoisie, winning independence, promoting national culture and meeting the needs of the working people. Here is one indicative sidelight on the situation at the time. On May 20, 1919, the Food Commissariat ordered summer camps for children to be set up and issued special rations - 400 grammes of potatoes a day, 200 grammes of beetroots, 29 grammes of fish, 50 grammes of meat, 200 grammes of bread, half an ounce of coffee, and 10 grammes of sweets. And this in starving Riga!

But this order was not destined to be fulfilled. Obedient to the will of the Greene mission, an army of 80,000 German mercenaries moved on Riga.

Janis Draudins remembers those battles. He also remembers the terrible tidings that came from Riga after the city fell on May 22, 1919.

Now about humanity and inhumanity.

Bloodshed...

An idea of what happened on May 22 may be gleaned from a shattering letter from the Latvian capital received by the leadership of Soviet Latvia on June 27:

"...A detailed description of what is happening here would be in place, but it can be summed up in a single word - bloodshed. The bloody orgy began on that fateful Thursday night and continues unabated. According to some very reliable sources, 4,500 people have been shot in Riga since then. That figure of course cannot be verified. It may be slightly more but perhaps even less than the actual figure. Judge for yourselves from the following figures: on June 6, 140 were shot, on June 8, 160, on June 10, 300, on June 11, 58. Who the victims were is hard to say, since the comrades who had remained in Riga were killed in the first few days. How many have been tortured to death in jail there is no way of knowing since practically no news comes from the prisoners. The prison conditions are frightful. Most of the arrested are held in the Central Prison where the comrades have been reduced to such a state that they lack the strength to show themselves at the windows. Most of the unfortunates are women. It looks as if the bourgeoisie in their frenzy have decided to wipe out the Latvian workers...

"...The initial slaughter has undergone some change. Courts-martial have been introduced. Consisting of two Germans, two Latvians and one member of some other nationality, they have set about annihilating people wholesale (en gros). The killed are no longer left in public view but are buried at once. The executions take place mainly in the daytime, and the condemned are forced to dig their own graves. We can judge of the number of victims by the size of the common graves which are usually 15 feet wide. The pits as a rule are filled to the very top with corpses and the wind often blows the earth away, revealing the bodies. You can estimate for yourselves how many bodies can be thrown into such pits. It takes a couple of days to fill them. At times the killing goes on uninterruptedly, day after day.

"...The mind is benumbed by this bloody nightmare, and the pen refuses to record it. You who have not witnessed it will never be able to convey to others the full horror of it all."

Lieutenant Johnson's story

What, the reader may ask, has all this to do with Greene? After all, he spoke about humanity and may even not have known of the savagery of the occupation forces. The latter possibility is unlikely. All doubts are dispelled, however, by the documentary evidence.

One such document was brought to my attention by the well-known Soviet researcher Professor Vilnis Sipols. In a 1924 copy of the Riga newspaper, Latvijas Kareivis, published by the Latvian War Ministry, he found the reminiscences of one Lieutenant Frank Johnson, who came to Latvia in the summer of 1919 on an assignment to make a "film record of events in all the areas where the American mission will operate."

The following incident occurred in Jelgava. Johnson was met at the railway station by members of the American military mission headed by Greene. That same evening he was given an assignment - to film the execution of 18 Bolsheviks in the local prison. The newspaper reported Johnson's impressions:

"The heavy prison gates creaked open slowly. Between two files of soldiers with Iron Division insignia and rifles with bayonets attached passed 18 men in tattered clothing....We observed with surprise that some of them were mere boys. These, we were told, were the Bolsheviks we had come to see...in the Baltic area, which the Germans described as a stronghold of Bolshevism."

Meanwhile a German officer had persuaded the Americans to give him a pack of cigarettes in exchange for permission to film the execution. First the condemned men were marched past the camera. After that the shooting, which took place outside the prison walls, was filmed. The prisoners were made to undress, lie down on the ground while the sentence was read out, after which they were led in threes to the edge of the pit.

"They were silent, not a sound was

heard. **Nothing but the clicking of the camera. Their faces expressed grim courage. One of them, a young lad, when his turn came ran to the pit. The camera caught the expression on his face - it was a grimace of defiance, of contempt for his killers...Six soldiers carried out the sentence - three aimed at the heart, three, at the head. They were obviously well trained. Their victims dropped dead into the grave."**

That is how Johnson described what he himself called "an unparallelled atrocity."

He sent his neatly typed reminiscences to the Imperial Military Archives, where they were filed away. In them Taube recalls that on May 22, 1919, he was in Riga where he met Greene.

What was Greene doing at the time? He expressed the wish to visit the Riga prison where arrested employees of Soviet institutions and Riga Bolsheviks were being held. Taube explains Greene's motives thus: "...he was probably looking for something sensational." After that, Greene asked to be present at the

Peektdeen, 15. februarī 1924. g. Numurs 11

LATVIJAS

KAREIVIS

Bolševiku manuskriptu cenzētājiem:

The continuation in Riga

It turns out that the cinematographic exercise of the American military mission did not end there. I found evidence of that in the Potsdam archives where I found a document of the supreme headquarters of the Baltic Landeswehr, numbered 2437/19 and dated May 27, 1919. Here is how it reads:

"1. The American mission wishes to film the commander of the Landeswehr together with Landeswehr units tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. For this purpose the forces are to be mustered at 10.15 a.m. in the following order:
at the head, outside the Petersburg Hotel, a strike group cavalry squadron, machine-gun platoon and the Medem battery, one shock group squadron, the Engelhardt cavalry squadron, the Malmede machine-gun company, a machine-gun battalion and the Ehmke battery. Uniform: steel helmets. The strike group will be in charge of the muster...

"2. For the execution of those condemned by the court-martial the strike group shall assign an ensign and 20 privates."

The document also bears the inscription "Done," which shows that the military parade must have taken place, as has the shooting. A circumstance of interest here is that Lieutenant Colonel Greene behaved in Riga exactly as he had in Jelgava. How do we know this?

Here is another piece of documentary evidence. This time the source is Landeswehr officer Baron Georg von Taube. During the Hitler period he decided to remind his superiors of his services in the struggle against Bolshevism.

Lieutenant Johnson's reminiscences were published in this issue.

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shooting of Bolsheviks. But here what the baron described as "a distressing incident" occurred: the execution squad was delayed and so, Taube relates, "in order not to prolong the agony of waiting, they started shooting the prisoners one by one." In Greene's presence.

What happened to the films taken in Riga and Jelgava? It would be a good thing to find them.

The finale of the mission

Even after the Riga massacre, Lieutenant Colonel Greene did not lose interest in the German mercenaries. Recalling a speech made by Greene at one conference, Baron von Taube wrote: "His demands were our demands."

But Greene had to retreat in face of the demands of other Entente countries, primarily Britain. In June, Britain pressed for interventionist reliance to be shifted from the universally hated Germans to the local bourgeois government. This was done by the British mission headed by General Gough. The pro-German Niedra cabinet was replaced by a new cabinet headed by Ulmanis, of whom Goltz observed with acerbity:

"British wheat could thrive in the Baltic only under a government headed by Ulmanis who, for the sake of becoming prime minister, liberally handed out the country's meagre wealth to the British merchants."

Once again Ulmanis came in on the strength of foreign bayonets: the first time with German backing, the second time, on orders from General Gough. This should be remembered, particularly by those who would like to depict Ulmanis as the personification of national independence, as is still done by some émigré leaders who have found refuge in the United States.

Greene was soon recalled. A touching farewell message from Foreign Minister Meierovics has been preserved in the archives:

"Your unusually energetic activity and genuine sympathy for our state will never be forgotten."

Knowing that Greene's "genuine sympathies" really lay with the German occupationists, one can only smile on reading this message. It ends, however, with fulsome assurances of loyalty:

"Needless to say, we would have been unable to solve all our problems on our own...All the more important then is the aid given us by liberal and wealthy America."

Liberal America, indeed!

On returning to Paris Greene did not become a passive observer. Another of his reports dealt with putting an end to Soviet power in Latvia and moving on against Petrograd.

On July 5, 1919, he lamented:

"Meanwhile the summer is slipping by and with it the chance for finally clearing the Baltic Provinces of Bolshevism, capturing Petrograd and organizing an aggressive movement against Bolshevism."

Foreign intervention made it possible to carry out the first of these objectives - the suppression of Soviet power in the Baltic by armed force. It was restored only in 1940. As regards Petrograd, Greene was right: the opportunity was lost.

●

Much water has flowed since then under the bridges of the Daugava. Today a new view opens on many things from the historical height of the past seventy years. But the indisputable facts remain. Soviet Latvia has been firmly established despite all the difficulties. From the history of its rise, from the history of the Baltic countries there cannot be expunged the pages inscribed - or rather trampled into it - by the boots of the interventionists, all those who, like Lieutenant Colonel Greene, wanted to dictate their will to the peoples of the Baltic republics.

All this gives food for thought. For reflection on how much the rhetoric of many of today's American politicians and propagandists who talk about the dedication of the U.S. to human rights, the rights of peoples to independent development, is worth.

■

DEATH AT THE BEAU-RIVAGE HOTEL

A political thriller without an epilogue



The Barschel affair, dubbed here the Kiel Watergate, has been in the headlines for several weeks in succession. More details of the affair come to light every day, hitting the top news story slot on TV.

Case history

An election campaign was under way in Schleswig-Holstein, the northernmost state of the Federal Republic of Germany, after 37 years of rule by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). This time the state government had good reason to fear that it might soon find itself in opposition. Opinion polls conducted at the beginning of the year, and election results in other lands, showed that the CDU was steadily losing the support of the electorate. The then Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein, Uwe Barschel, was determined to remain in power. In order to assure the CDU's return to power, it was decided to smear his chief rival, Björn Engholm, leader of the Social Democratic opposition, who had done better in opinion polls than anyone else. The "dirty tricks" campaign followed a classic scenario, complete with poison pen letters, surveillance, bare-faced lies, denunciations, and provocations. It was coordinated by Reiner Pfeiffer, executive secretary at the press desk of the state government chancellery.

New Times has already carried some details of the affair (No. 41/87).

A "bomb" for the Minister-President

The bomb went off on the eve of the election scheduled for September 13. The magazine Der Spiegel carried an affidavit authenticated by Pfeiffer's solicitor, confessing to backstage machinations by his Prime Minister and Pfeiffer's own part in them. Political scandals are not infrequent in the F.R.G., but this time the public was particularly incensed by what were clearly mafia methods in the struggle for power.

Uwe Barschel began by denying everything, and filed a suit against his former secretary and Der Spiegel. He went on to demand that a parliamentary commission of inquiry be set up to investigate their offences. However, this failed to save his party from losing its absolute majority in the Landtag. The party could not now secure the required majority of seats even if it entered into a coalition with the Free Democrats.

The Minister-President refused to stand down and the CDU faction in the Landtag gave him a vote of confidence. Speaking at a news conference on September 18, Uwe Barschel rejected all of Reiner Pfeiffer's accusations on his "personal word of honour," and eight statements were made on oath. Reiner Pfeiffer responded by producing more details. Reports confirming his allegations began to appear. In an unexpected move, Uwe Barschel called a cabinet meeting on September 25 to announce his resignation, but continued to maintain that he had known nothing of the shady doings until he read about them in Der Spiegel. Having made his statement, he went off for a vacation in the Canary Islands.

The very first hearing held by the parliamentary commission of inquiry revealed that Uwe Barschel's "word of honour. was worthless. At the same time, the public prosecutor's office announced that it was suspicious about Uwe Barschel, and that it wanted him stripped of his parliamentary immunity. Then, the CDU faction in the Kiel Landtag said it intended to revoke Uwe Barschel's mandate. Uwe Barschel was "profoundly disappointed" at the line taken by his party, but continued to stand his ground.

On October 10, Uwe Barschel left for Geneva, ostensibly for a rendez-vous with one Robert Roloff, who apparently had documents that would clear him of all charges. In a message to the chairman of the CDU faction in Kiel, he said he was prepared to testify before the parliamentary commission on October 12.

"Please do not disturb"

Iberia airliner landed in Geneva at about 3 p.m. Uwe Barschel went through customs and walked towards a taxi rank. Two Stern reporters accosted him in the airport lounge, but he spoke to them in English and pretended not to understand what they wanted. He got into a taxi and left. However, the reporters learned that he was staying at the old-world fashionable lakeside hotel, the Beau-Rivage. They failed to get through to him in room 317 or to intercept him outside it. Uwe Barschel stayed in his room and answered

NIKITA ZHOLKVER has taken up his duties in Bonn as New Times own correspondent in the F.R.G.

Born in Moscow in 1959. On graduating from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, he worked for New Times first in the reference department, then as a staff writer, and subsequently as a senior staff writer on the capitalist countries desk. He is married, with one daughter.

no calls, although he used his phone many times.

Next morning the reporters were again lying in wait for him in the hotel dining room. They tried to reach him on the phone and even knocked at his door. At 12:30 one of them pressed the knob on which a "do not disturb" sign was hanging. The door was unlocked.

Inside the room it was dark except for the little light coming from a small chink in the curtains. The bed was made up. Several sheets of paper with a detailed account of the rendez-voux with the mysterious Robert Roloff were scattered by the phone. They were in Uwe Barschel's hand.

The reporter photographed each sheet and made for the door. On his way out he accidentally stumbled into the bathroom.



Rivals' handshake. Uwe Barschel and Björn Engholm meet shortly before the row.

Photo from Stern

Uwe Barschel was lying fully dressed in the bath which was filled with water. A towel was wrapped around his right hand. He was dead.

What had happened to Uwe Barschel?

Reports were leaked to the press that Uwe Barschel suffered from a heart condition, and had recently had a coronary. Moreover, he had miraculously survived an air crash at the beginning of May, which had further damaged his health. Perhaps it was a heart attack after all? But how could he possibly have fallen into a full bath without splashing water onto the floor? That theory held for several days while the postmortem results were awaited. The postmortem showed traces of five types of drugs, soporifics and tranquillizers in Barschel's stomach.

The official theory is that Barschel took his own life. The police, most newspapers and F.R.G. citizens questioned in opinion polls subscribe to it. It goes something like this.

Uwe Barschel committed suicide after he had become caught up in his own self-contradictory statements, and realized that he was politically dead and that his own party had abandoned him.

In order to protect the good name of his family he decided to avenge himself on his rivals by making his suicide look like murder. With that goal in mind he invented the Robert Roloff connection, and called his wife and brother to inform them of the success of his "dangerous mission" to Geneva and the risks he was taking. He left the door of his room unlocked because the assassin would not have been able to lock it from the inside after the murder.

The suicide theory explains some of the unusual circumstances surrounding the discovery of the body. Uwe Barschel apparently took his life according to a method described in a booklet published by the German Society for a Humane Death. But a number of discrepancies in the inquiry's findings suggest another theory.

Was it murder? Uwe Barschel's widow and brother maintain that he was victim to a conspiracy.

An hour and a half before the door of room 317 was opened by Stern reporters, the door knob sign said "Please make up the room." Half an hour later it said "Please do not disturb." Who had turned the sign around? And what for?

If Uwe Barschel did indeed go straight to the hotel after he flew in and did not, as he claimed in the note he left, take a stroll in the park with Robert Roloff, whence so much mud on his shoes and the bath mat? On orders from the prosecutor's office in Lübeck, the apartment of the journalist Bernd Plogmann was searched in Hanover. The police would not be drawn on what they found there. The indications are that the police have not ruled out the possibility of Bernd Plogmann having been the man whom Uwe Barschel met or was supposed to have met in Geneva. Between May and August of last year Bernd Plogmann was assistant editor-in-chief of the Bremen newspaper Weser Report. Reiner Pfeiffer was with that newspaper at the time. Bernd Plogmann could have been in possession of facts about Reiner Pfeiffer, which Uwe Barschel could have used either to clear himself of all charges or smear his former secretary. According to the magazine Der Spiegel, Bernd Plogmann is on the payroll of the secret police in Lower Saxony.

Supporters of that theory believe that international arms dealers were involved in the murder. According to The Daily Telegraph, Uwe Barschel was involved in Irangate. Reports in the West German press recall the recent row over the illegal sales by a Kiel shipyard of submarine blueprints to South Africa. It transpired that Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Bavarian premier Franz Josef Straus, Finance Minister and CDU chairman of Schleswig-Holstein Gerhard Stoltenberg and some other federal ministers either knew about the deal or were involved in it. The Kiel government could not have been unaware of the illegal deal. It is still unclear whether or not Uwe Barschel was involved in it. Supporters of the conspiracy theory are sure that Uwe Barschel knew too much and that he represented a serious risk for his former accomplices after his political career had come to an end. That is why it was decided to get rid of him.

There can be no doubt that Uwe Barschel's fall from power was a catastrophe for him. His death at the Hotel Beau-Rivage represented the culmination, rather than the epilogue to the Kiel Watergate.

On lease from Springer

The parliamentary commission set up at the insistence of Uwe Barschel has continued with its inquiry. Every new witness adds another piece to the jigsaw puzzle, or tries to remove some that have already fallen into place. The absence of the two principal witnesses hinders the commission. One of them is in his grave, and the other, Reiner Pfeiffer, has said he will not testify and invoked the appropriate law giving him that right. The body of evidence now before the commission is more than enough, however. Details have come to light of the part played in the affair by the Springer publishing concern.

On August 25 last year Uwe Barschel asked the chairman of the board of Springer to lend him a capable journalist who could work on the press desk of the state government during the election campaign in Schleswig-Holstein. The man was very soon found. He was Reiner Pfeiffer. In order to make up for the loss of pay, Reiner Pfeiffer received 68,000 marks from his employer, who was only too glad to do a Conservative government a good turn. Reiner Pfeiffer also received a pledge that his contract would be renewed.

The fact that Springer was prepared to vouch for Reiner Pfeiffer was good enough for Uwe Barschel's chancellery, and Reiner Pfeiffer was not even screened by the Department for Safeguarding the Constitution, although the procedure is mandatory for anyone recruited to the civil service.

Springer is now trying to dissociate itself from its erstwhile employee. It broke off his contract, citing his questionable past and sparing him no abuse. Could it be that it was a man of just that kind, prepared to disregard the law and moral norms alike, that was really needed by Springer in Kiel? Schleswig-Holstein is the main stronghold of the giant concern, which now owns many previously independent newspapers and radio stations there, as well as Europe's most sophisticated printing works in Ahrensburg. Springer stood to lose a great deal if the CDU lost the elections, and naturally tried to preserve the status quo. It was not particularly choosy about the means used to attain that end. Reiner Pfeiffer had

a "good" record. While on staff of the Bremen newspaper Weser Report, he forced a Social Democratic Senator and the director of an airport to resign.

This is a crisis

One of the Federal Chancellor's closest associates described the present position of the CDU as its most profound crisis for many years. The party has fallen to the lowest position in the opinion polls and mass defections have begun.

The Kiel scandal was no doubt the principal external reason for the dramatic decline of the party's standing. The dirty tricks against the opposition and the way the leaders of the party treated their own protégé contributed to it in equal measure. At first the party leaders defended him, although they must have known about his misdemeanors, and then they left him high and dry.

But it would be wrong to assume that the Barschel affair was the sole reason for the crisis in the CDU. There are several other reasons for this, among them the unending controversy within the ruling coalition, the unpopular methods of combating AIDS proposed by some CDU figures, the government's inconclusive stand on the issue of Euromissiles, its inability to cope with some of the economic problems facing the country, the growth of national debt, and the proposed tax reform.

Ironically, the mastermind of the reform is Gerhard Stoltenberg, Federal Finance Minister and Chairman of the CDU in Schleswig-Holstein. He has been dubbed Barschel's godfather in the F.R.G. His authority in the party was once undisputed.

The tax reform with the help of which the Federal Finance Minister is hoping to close the loopholes in the budget is causing great dissatisfaction, as it will hit the poor hardest. Gerhard Stoltenberg's political career has been seriously compromised. What was his part in Kiel Watergate? That question has so far remained unanswered.

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A new election is to be held in Schleswig-Holstein as it now has a hung parliament. The Social Democrats are naturally pressing for an early election, while the Christian Democrats are, on the contrary, trying to delay the election until after the dust has settled. The Free Democrats also want a break. They are hoping that their coalition partner will somehow manage to get out of the mess. Be that as it may, the election is unlikely to bring the political thriller to its conclusion. The chances are that the affair will remain unresolved.

NIKITA ZHOLKVER
our own correspondent
Bonn

Good films are rare

Impressions of film director Karen Shakhnazarov from the second Tokyo film festival

The first Tokyo internationlal film festival was held two years ago. This time the festival's programme was more impressive. There were films from Japan, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the P.R.C., India, Nepal, Czechoslovakia, France, Canada, Argentina, Australia, Israel, South Korea and Britain.

The international jury was headed by the famous American actor Gregory Peck and included Allan Bergman of the U.S.A., French director Claude Berri, Alan Parker of Britain, Mrinal Sen of India, film critic Naoki Togawa and director Masahiro Shinoda of Japan, American actress Dyan Cannon and Soviet film director Karen Shakhnazarov. His film "We are from a jazz band" was successfully screened in Japan.

As many as 14 films from various countries competed for the Grand Prix. For young directors there was a contest for honorary prizes: the Golden and the Silver Sakura. There was an extensive hors concours programme which included the best films from countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the most remarkable films from Hollywood, science fiction films and a retrospective screening of works by Federico Fellini.



"The jury was benevolent and fair," said Karen Shakhnazarov, "Gregory Peck is a wise, tactful and cultured man. It was largely due to him that it was possible to avoid the debate getting too political. It was conducted in a calm and open manner, and there was not the slightest pressure during the voting. The results of the contest objectively reflect the opinion of the jury. The Grand Prix was earned by the Chinese film 'An old well,' directed by Wu Thianming. The consensus of the jury was that this unusual film attested to the vast potential of Chinese film makers. The film gives a realistic portrayal of the hard life of peasants in a village that has no water, and reveals the psychology of the Chinese, with which Europeans and Americans are little acquainted."

Zhang Yimou, who played the main role, earned the best actor award. The best actress award went to Rachel Ward for her performance in the Australian film "The Good Wife." Gregory Peck expressed regret at the presentation ceremony that he was unable to give the same award to Soviet actress Leila Abashidze, who appeared in the film "Turnover" directed by Lana Gogoberidze. With deep sincerity and poignancy she played the role of an ageing actress who had been a favourite of filmgoers in her young days and whose career later declined. The film echoes the fate of Leila Abashidze herself. The queen of Georgian cinema, she gave 45 years of her life to acting, but this was her first role in ten years. The film won the second prize for direction.

"Lana Gogoberidze has used the possibilities of the screenplay effectively," Karen Shakhnazarov said. "The film is imbued with warmth and irradiates the

hope for a humane response from a kindred soul.... The Tokyo festival can be summed up in these two words: excellent organization! But the films entered for the festival were on the whole not of a very high standard, and it cannot be compared with the Moscow festival. I would like to commend the young film makers' contest. It is the world's only contest in which the two winners receive monetary prizes of 20 and 10 million yen along with the awards. These are considerable sums of money, and young directors, who are usually pressed for funds, will hopefully compete for the prizes, which will enable them to start making new films...."

And yet a number of problems will have to be resolved for the Tokyo young directors' contest, which Karen Shakhnazarov mentioned, to become a success. One of these problems is the principle on which films are selected. The contest was held as if in two, or even three stages. As many as 17 films from 15 countries were initially chosen for the festival. Then a panel consisting of Japanese only selected four films to be seen by the international jury. At this point political sympathies and antipathies came into play. In the opinion of the majority of filmgoers, two of the four films selected for the "finals" did not conform to the required high artistic standards. Many films of greater merit had been rejected. There was perplexity when the excellent film by Soviet director Yuri Kara, "Next day there was war," a screen adaptation of a novel by Boris Vasilyev, was passed over. Not a single viewer remained indifferent to the fate of senior-grade schoolpupils of the last year before the war. But somebody, apparently, was reluctant to run the risk of losing a valuable prize to the U.S.S.R.

Still the first prize, the Sakura Gold, went to a worthy choice. 28-year-old British director Harry Hook made the film "Kitchen Toto" from his own screenplay. The director said that in his childhood he lived in Kenya for many years, and that he knew Africa and its numerous problems well.

The film about the Africans' struggle against British colonialists in the fifties turned out well. It centres on the fate of an African boy who has to choose between loyalty to his people and friendship with the son of a Briton, the chief of police, whom the rebels intend to liquidate. A candid film, at times starkly realistic, and excellently made.

The third Tokyo international film festival is to be held in two years' time. When asked what problems the festival's sponsors should come to grips with, Karen Shakhnazarov said:

"Though the festival was obviously a success, it still left me with a sad feeling: to judge from most of the films entered for the contest, really good films are very rare! We get carried away in criticizing Soviet cinema, but I think that on the whole we have no reason to be too self-critical. Consider how many acute and pressing problems there are in the world, not only political and social problems, but also personal and human ones. And here in Tokyo the films dealt mainly with trivial themes. Humour, merriment and laughter were lacking. Films were long and tedious. Alan Parker put his finger on it when he said he would gladly have given the prize to a comedy had it found its way to the festival. As for the Japanese cinema, it was represented by far from the best examples and it was unclear whether the reason for this was crisis, the recession, or something else...."

Indeed, it is thrillers and horror films, which are all very similar, and whose only merit is high technical skill, that are mostly screened in Japan.

Incidentally, we are too timid in our attempts to offer our films for distribution in Japan. Though a great number of American films are shown, our films could still attract filmgoers there. True, a Japanese journalist said: "We have got too accustomed to films with the sound track in English, and can't be bothered to read subtitles, so even good films from Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Asian countries stand little chance of success."

Perhaps, there is a need to consider making English versions of films even if only of those that are certain to attract interest abroad?

VLADIMIR OVSYANNIKOV
our own correspondent

Tokyo

Guests at New Times

Alexander Bryansky, or Red Sasha, as he signed his revolutionary verses, has had a remarkable life. Now 104, he took part in the storming of the Winter Palace, and was chosen by Felix Dzerzhinsky as one of Lenin's bodyguards. At the commemorative evening held at New Times on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, he recalled his meetings with Lenin, the indelible impression made on him by the leader of the world's first socialist state, and the early years of the revolution and the civil war.

Georgy Vasilyev and Alexei Ivashchenko were also present at the New Times gathering. In 1986 they were prize-winners in the first all-union amateur song festival in Saratov. The pair perform their own work, an extremely popular trend. In their student years (they both studied geography at Moscow University) they were members of a group that performed songs with a strong political flavour. They continued to write lyrics and music after graduating, and to this day, in spite of the fact that Georgy Vasilyev is a practising scientist and Alexei Ivashchenko a professional actor, they are still enthusiastically performing, and continue to perfect their style. Next spring, the recording firm Melodia is to bring out their first LP. The thirteen songs they have recorded for it provide convincing proof of the high professional standard they have attained.

New Times extends its heartfelt thanks to its guests.

Photos by V. Panov

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

New Times meets its readers



New Times journalists have visited Prague, Bratislava, Plzen, Rome, Genoa, Florence and Palermo to meet their readers there. At those encounters we sought to find out what readers thought of our magazine, and what they expected from it in 1988. We enjoyed words of praise, of course, but were especially keen to hear criticisms and suggestions.

We had frank discussions with many Soviet readers as well. A New Times Forum was held in the House of Political Education, Trubnaya Square, Moscow. It was addressed not only by our staff writers but also by the well-known authors, playwright Mikhail Shatrov and Professor Alexander Butenko, D. Sc. (Philosophy). Later we were invited to the New Times festival sponsored by the residents of Zelenograd, a fast-growing city within a city. Zelenograd is part of Moscow, with many institutes, laboratories, design offices and modern factories. The capital of Soviet computer engineering, Zelenograd is always one up on its neighbours in bringing the latest in technological progress—be it new architectural trends or means of telecommunication, personal computers or video equipment—within its resident's reach.

What does Zelenograd's technological elite think of the magazine? We found out at a meeting of lecturers and writers which was followed by the New Times festival—sponsored, incidentally, by young people. Our Zelenograd readers suggested that along with foreign policy commentaries New Times should carry more articles about the perestroika now under way in the U.S.S.R., penetrating analyses of current events, and forecasts, as well as covering the latest developments in music, art, literature and sport, and keeping readers up to date on scientific progress and the impact of the scientific and technological revolution on social development. The editors are expected to give more attention to youth and its problems.

In short, every new issue of our magazine should find interested readers.

New Times will do its best to live up to these expectations.

On photos:
New Times journalists meet their readers in Zelenograd.

Photos by V. Panov



On Thera island.

INTERNATIONAL CONTEST

MAN AND MANKIND

Vladimir Pchelkin (U.S.S.R.)

A view of Athens.